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Explaining Choice-of-Entity Decisions by Silicon
Valley Start-Ups
GREGG POLSKY†
Perhaps the most fundamental role of a business lawyer is to recommend the optimal entity
choice for nascent business enterprises. Nevertheless, even in 2018, the choice-of-entity analysis
remains highly muddled. Most business lawyers across the United States consistently
recommend flow-through entities, such as limited liability companies and S corporations, to
their clients. In contrast, a discrete group of highly sophisticated business lawyers, those who
advise start-ups in Silicon Valley and other hotbeds of start-up activity, prefer C corporations.
Prior commentary has described and tried to explain this paradox without finding an adequate
explanation. These commentators have noted a host of superficially plausible explanations, all
of which they ultimately conclude are not wholly persuasive. The puzzle therefore remains.
This Article attempts to finally solve the puzzle by examining two factors that have been either
vastly underappreciated or completely ignored in the existing literature. First, while previous
commentators have briefly noted that flow-through structures are more complex and
administratively burdensome, they did not fully appreciate the source, nature, and extent of these
problems. In the unique start-up context, the complications of flow-through structures are
exponentially more problematic, to the point where widespread adoption of flow-through
entities is completely impractical. Second, the literature has not appreciated the effect of
perplexing, yet pervasive, tax asset valuation problems in the public company context. The
conventional wisdom is that tax assets are ignored or severely undervalued in public company
stock valuations. In theory, the most significant benefit of flow-through status for start-ups is
that it can result in the creation of valuable tax assets upon exit. However, the conventional
wisdom makes this moot when the exit is through an initial public offering or sale to a public
company, which are the desired types of exits for start-ups. The result is that the most significant
benefit of using a flow-through is eliminated because of the tax asset pricing problem.
Accordingly, while the costs of flow-through structures are far higher than have been
appreciated, the benefits of these structures are much smaller than they appear.

†
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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most fundamental role of the business lawyer is to recommend
the optimal entity choice for nascent business enterprises. Nevertheless, even in
2018, the choice-of-entity analysis remains highly muddled. Most advisors
across the United States consistently recommend flow-through entities, such as
limited liability companies and S corporations to their clients. In contrast, a
discrete group of highly sophisticated lawyers, those who advise start-ups in
Silicon Valley and other hotbeds of start-up activity, stubbornly prefer C
corporations.
Prior commentary has described and tried to explain this paradox without
finding an adequate explanation.1 These commentators have noted a host of
superficially plausible explanations, all of which, they ultimately conclude, are
not wholly persuasive. The puzzle therefore remains.
This Article attempts to finally solve the puzzle by examining two factors
that have been either vastly underappreciated or completely ignored in the
existing literature. First, while previous commentators have briefly noted that
flow-through structures are more complex and administratively burdensome,
they did not fully appreciate the source, nature, and extent of these problems. In
the unique start-up context, the complications of flow-through structures are
exponentially more problematic, to the point where widespread adoption of
flow-through entities is completely impractical. Second, the literature has not
appreciated the effect of perplexing, yet pervasive, tax asset valuation problems
in the public company context. The conventional wisdom is that tax assets are
ignored or severely undervalued in public company stock valuations.2 In theory,
the most significant theoretical benefit of flow-through status for start-ups is that
it can result in the creation of valuable tax assets upon exit. However, the
conventional wisdom makes this moot when the exit is through an initial public
offering or sale to a public company, which are the desired types of exits for
start-ups. The result is that the most significant benefit of using a flow-through
is eliminated because of the tax asset pricing problem. Accordingly, while the
costs of flow-through structures are far higher than have been appreciated, the
benefits of these structures are much smaller than they appear.
Part I of this Article provides background on the choice-of-entity issue and
describes the tax implications of the choice. Part II discusses how Silicon Valley
1. See generally Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737
(1994); Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-ups, 57 TAX L. REV.
137 (2003); Daniel S. Goldberg, Choice of Entity for a Venture Capital Start-Up: The Myth of Incorporation,
55 TAX LAW. 923 (2002); Calvin H. Johnson, Why Do Venture Capital Funds Burn Research and Development
Deductions?, 29 VA. TAX REV. 29 (2009).
2. See Gregg Polsky & Adam H. Rosenzweig, The Up-C Revolution, 71 TAX L. REV. 415, 429–32 (2018)
(explaining the conventional view that tax assets are undervalued in the public company context).
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start-ups differ from other small businesses, as the solution to the puzzle must
be based on one or more of these differences. Part III sets forth the traditional,
yet not wholly satisfying, explanations for why Silicon Valley start-ups prefer
corporations. Part IV explains the underappreciated factors that push the choiceof-entity equation toward the corporate form. The Article then concludes by
explaining how recent developments will affect the choice-of-entity analysis
going forward.
I. CHOICE-OF-ENTITY BACKGROUND
A. CLASSIFICATION OF ENTITY
Owners of a new business can choose among a variety of state law entities.
A business can be operated as a corporation, a general partnership, a limited
partnership, a limited liability company (LLC), a limited liability partnership
(LLP), a limited liability limited partnership (LLLP), or another alphabet soup
entity, depending on the laws in the state of organization. In most situations, the
corporate or LLC forms will be the most attractive because they are universally
available to all sorts of businesses and offer complete limited liability for all of
their owners.3
From a federal income tax perspective, there are only two main types of
“tax entities:” flow-through and corporate. S corporations and partnerships are
flow-through entities, while C corporations are corporate entities. Between the
two types of flow-through entities, partnerships are generally more attractive. In
part, this is because S corporation status is available only for entities that are
owned entirely by U.S. individuals (as opposed to owners that are entities
themselves or who are foreign individuals).4 Accordingly, this Article will focus
on partnerships as the flow-through entity of choice, but the analysis would not
change significantly if the flow-through entity were an S corporation.
Tax partnerships generally include all state law entities other than
corporations.5 Thus, general and limited partnerships, LLCs, LLPs, and LLLPs
are all partnerships for tax purposes.6 C corporations include state law
corporations and other business entities that affirmatively elect corporate status.7
Typically, a new business will often need to choose between being a state-law
LLC taxed as a partnership or a state-law corporation taxed as a C corporation.
The state law consequences of each are nearly identical, but the tax distinctions
are vast.8

3. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 923. LLPs and LLLPs are less popular because they generally offer less
limited liability protection than corporations or LLCs.
4. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (2012).
5. See generally Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2006).
6. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (2006).
7. Id.
8. JACK S. LEVIN & DONALD E. ROCAP, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND
ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS ¶¶ 303.1.1–303.1.4, at 3-52 to 3-54 (Martin D. Ginsburg & Russell S. Light
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B. FUNDAMENTAL TAX DIFFERENCES
Unlike corporations, partnerships themselves are not subject to tax.9
Instead, all of the partnership’s taxable income (or loss) flows through the entity
and is reported on the partners’ individual tax returns, in the same manner as if
each partner had realized its share of the partnership income (or loss) directly.10
This results in partnership income being taxed once and only once, when the
income is earned by the partnership.11 When that income is subsequently
distributed (in the form of cash or property distributions), those distributions are
generally tax-free so that there is no second level of tax.12 If a partnership
generates tax losses, those losses also flow through the entity and are available
to the partners to offset income from other sources, subject to certain general
restrictions and limitations that may apply to loss utilization.13
On the other hand, a C corporation is taxed separately as an entity.14 The
corporation realizes income and pays tax on that income much like an individual
would, albeit now at the dramatically reduced tax rate of 21%, down from the
historical 35% rate.15 When the corporation subsequently distributes its after-tax
income in the form of a dividend, the shareholders generally pay a second level
of tax.16 The dividend tax rate is lower than the ordinary individual tax rate by
approximately twenty percentage points.17 This reduction blunts the effect of
double taxation, but nevertheless the double taxation has still historically
resulted in much harsher taxation of income than if the income were earned
directly, or through a partnership, and taxed only once.18

eds., 2014) (discussing the similarities and distinctions between the traditional corporate form and the newer
LLC form, especially in regards to legal liabilities).
9. I.R.C. § 701 (2012).
10. Id. § 702.
11. LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 8, ¶ 302.2.1, at 3-34.
12. I.R.C. § 731.
13. Individual partners face three separate limitations that may impact their ability to tax losses: (1) if they
do not have enough passive income, id. § 469; (2) if the partners do not have enough amounts at risk in their
partnership, id. § 465; or (3) if the partners do not have enough outside basis in their partnership interest, id.
§ 704(d).
14. Id. § 11(a).
15. James R. Browne, Choice of Entity for a Startup Business After Tax Reform, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 30,
2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/choice-entity-startup-business-after-tax-reform (“A corporation is
a separately taxable entity and pays tax on its taxable income at a flat rate of 21%, down from graduated rates
of up to 35% for 2017 and prior years.”).
16. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7). The same double taxation results if the corporation reinvests (instead of distributes)
its after-tax cash. The reinvestment increases the stock price. When the shareholder sells the stock, that
incremental increase will be taxed as additional capital gain.
17. Id. § 1.
18. For example, assume that $100 is earned by a corporation. Historically, the corporation would pay $35
of tax, leaving $65 to be distributed. A 20% tax on a dividend of $65 would leave the shareholder with $52,
meaning that the combined tax rate was 48%. On the other hand, if the $100 was earned by a partnership and
the partners were subject to a 40% ordinary income tax rate, the partners would be left with $60. Other factors,
such as state taxes and the net investment income tax in § 1411, complicate this analysis, but in general, income
earned by corporations was historically subject to greater taxation than income earned by a partnership. The Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, by significantly reducing the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%, reduces this
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If the corporation generates net operating losses (NOLs), those losses are
trapped in the corporation.19 NOLs can generally be carried forward and used to
offset future income realized by the corporation.20 Delayed utilization of losses
reduces their value due to the time-value of money. In addition, NOLs that are
never used, because the corporation never has sufficient income against which
to apply them, result in no tax benefit whatsoever.
The single-versus-double tax and the untrapped-versus-trapped loss
distinctions are the most fundamental differences between partnerships and
corporations. Another important distinction between the two entities relates to
flexibility. If the owners of a business entity that is classified as a partnership
later desire to reclassify the entity as a corporation, the conversion typically
generates no tax costs.21 On the other hand, reclassifying a corporation as a
partnership requires an actual or deemed liquidation of the corporation, which
will have significant tax costs if the business has appreciated in valuation
substantially between its inception and the date of conversion.22 These costs
often make a conversion from corporation to partnership financially infeasible.23
For these three primary reasons (reduced taxation of income, treatment of
losses, and flexibility), business lawyers generally recommend forming a
partnership over a corporation when advising early stage businesses.24 Other
factors may play a role, but they too tend to push in favor of partnership
classification. For example, property can generally be easily moved into and out
of partnerships without tax consequences, which is not the case in the corporate
context.25 Nevertheless, in some circumstances, corporate status (whether C or

disparity and in some cases, turns it on its head. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat.
2054.
19. Bankman, supra note 1, at 1753 (“Losses from the partnership would flow through to the partners and
could be used by those partners to offset other sources of income, while losses from the corporation remain
‘trapped’ at the corporate level.”).
20. I.R.C. § 172.
21. JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS, RESTRUCTURINGS, AND
REORGANIZATIONS § 3.5A (2d ed. Supp. 2018) (“[U]sually little or no tax gain need be recognized when an
entity that is classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes merges into another entity that is classified as a
partnership for federal tax purposes or converts into or merges with a corporation and the 80% ‘control’ test of
I.R.C. §§ 351(a) and 368(c) is satisfied.”).
22. I.R.C. § 336(a) (requiring the recognition of gain by liquidating corporation to the extent the
corporation’s assets have a fair market value in excess of basis).
23. John O. Everett et al., Planning Considerations When Converting a C Corporation to an LLC, TAX
ADVISER (Jan. 31, 2011), https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2011/feb/raabe-banner-feb11.html (noting that
if the converting corporation holds highly appreciated assets, there could be “significant and immediate income
(and transfer) tax costs”).
24. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 15 (“A good starting point for the analysis is to abandon the reflexive
choice of a corporation and view the LLC as the default legal entity choice.”).
25. See Laurence E. Crouch, Revival of the Choice of Entity Analysis: Use of Limited Liability Companies
for Start-Up Businesses and the “Up-C” Structure, in 11 THE PARTNERSHIP TAX PRACTICE SERIES: PLANNING
FOR DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 210-17
(Louis S. Freeman & Clifford M. Warren eds., 2017) (“It is easier for an LLC than a corporation to acquire these
types of entities on a tax-free basis in exchange for its equity. This is because a tax-free reorganization would
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S) may be preferred. For example, many professional service businesses (for
example, law firms and medical practices) are structured as S corporations to
exploit an employment tax advantage.26 But, in general, new businesses across
the United States are advised to organize themselves as LLCs, which are taxed
as partnerships.27
However, this conventional wisdom has been disregarded in the venture
capital (VC) world. In Silicon Valley and other hotbeds of VC activities,
founders are often told in no uncertain terms to form a corporation.28 And, if the
business was originally formed as a partnership, VC investors will typically
require that it convert to corporate status as a condition of their investment.29
The conventional choice-of-entity approach is thus completely flipped on its
head in the VC world. This is the puzzle that is explored in this Article.
II. VENTURE CAPITAL BACKGROUND
Early stage businesses that desire VC investment (“start-ups”) are distinct
from other nascent businesses (“Main Street new businesses”) in a variety of
ways. The explanation for the choice-of-entity puzzle therefore must be based
on one or more of these differences. This Part describes the material differences.
Of course, not all start-ups are alike; nor are all new small businesses. And,
occasionally there is some crossover between the two. For example, a Main
Street small business may not initially plan to solicit VC funding, but may, due
to higher-than-expected growth potential, become a start-up. Nevertheless, the
differences described below are generally representative of the two mostly
distinct worlds.
A. MAIN STREET NEW BUSINESSES
Main Street new businesses typically obtain financing from just a few
sources. Besides using their own capital and those of friends and family,30 small
businesses often look to debt financing from banks or the Small Business
Administration.31 Importantly, the equity investors are U.S. individuals who are
not be available if the target is not a corporation and because section 721, unlike section 351, does not require
the persons receiving interests in the acquiring entity to be in control of such acquiring entity.”).
26. There are certain employment tax benefits associated with S-Corps and not associated with LLCs or
partnerships. See Thomas E. Fritz, Flowthrough Entities and the Self-Employment Tax: Is It Time for a Uniform
Standard, 17 VA. TAX REV. 811, 833–34 (1998).
27. See Browne, supra note 15.
28. See Bankman, supra note 1, at 1739–40 (noting that at the time of VC investment, VC funds will
structure, or re-structure, entities to corporate form).
29. Id.
30. See How to Borrow from Family and Friends, WALL ST. J.: HOW TO GUIDE,
http://guides.wsj.com/small-business/funding/how-to-borrow-from-family-and-friends/ (last visited Jan. 19,
2019) (noting that founders usually resort to informal investors such as family and friends).
31. Jared Hecht, Are You Running a Startup or Small Business? What’s the Difference?, FORBES (Dec. 8,
2017, 2:39 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaredhecht/2017/12/08/are-you-running-a-startup-or-smallbusiness-whats-the-difference/#46d4e3b226c5 (“[S]mall business owners typically turn to debt financing
through small business loans to meet their funding goals.”); see also Rosemary Peavler, Commercial Bank Loans
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not “professional” start-up investors. In addition, there usually are only a handful
of initial equity owners.
These new businesses, while riskier than existing small businesses, are
intended to be operated for a long time and, if all goes well, to be carried on by
future generations of the founders.32 The upside is often quite limited. There is
typically no hope or inclination for the business to eventually go public or be
sold to a large company.33 Instead, the desire is to slowly and steadily build and
grow an increasingly profitable business that will support the founders and their
families.34 In addition, the growth is often expected to be funded internally, by
retained earnings or new debt that is supported by expected future growth, as
opposed to new sources of equity capital.35
Main Street new businesses generally do not pay equity compensation to a
large number of service providers.36 Thus, the founders get all or nearly all of
the sweat equity. Additional service providers are commonly compensated with
salaries and, perhaps, incentive-based bonuses, but not with equity.37 This factor,
combined with the small number of initial cash investors and absence of followon investors, means that there is often only a handful of equity owners.
Finally, the expectation for the founders is that the small business will
fairly quickly become a profitable enterprise.38 Founders may expect some
losses in the early years, but those losses will not be extreme and the hope is
that, at least within the first few years, the business is in the black.39
B. START-UPS
In the start-up context, VC funds supply a large amount of the equity
investments.40 VC funds themselves are owned mostly by professional VC
investors, such as charities and private foundations, pension funds, sovereign
wealth funds, family offices, and wealthy individuals.41 In addition, angel
investors (wealthy individuals who invest directly in a large number of very
for Small Businesses, BALANCE SMALL BUS. (May 15, 2018), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/business-loansfrom-commercial-banks-for-small-businesses-393101 (describing commercial bank loans as an important
source of money for small businesses); U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/funding-programs/loans
(last visited Jan. 19, 2019) (noting that the SBA helps provide loans to small businesses).
32. See Hecht, supra note 31 (“[G]enerally speaking, small business owners intend to create self-sustaining
and long-lasting small businesses.”).
33. See id.
34. See id. (“[T]he end goal for a small business . . . [is] to stay in business.”).
35. See id. (noting that the goal for small businesses is to become “self-sustaining”).
36. Cf. Johnson, supra note 1, at 69–71 (discussing the use of stock option (or equity) compensation for
start-ups).
37. Id.
38. See Hecht, supra note 31 (“A small business [unlike a startup] is a self-sustaining organization that
generates revenue from the first day of opening. They don’t require major investments and time to formulate a
company that works.”).
39. See id.
40. Susan C. Morse & Eric J. Allen, Innovation and Taxation at Start-up Firms, 69 TAX L. REV. 357, 374
(2016) (discussing which start-ups try to obtain funding from VC funds).
41. LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 8, ¶ 102, at 1-3.
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early-stage start-ups) along with founders and their friends and family, often
make seed equity investments before, or occasionally simultaneously with, VC
investors.42
VC funds look exclusively for high-risk, high-reward investments.43 They
invest in highly speculative business ideas with extremely significant
opportunities for growth, but also with a very high likelihood of failure.44
Because VC funds generally are required to liquidate within about ten years, VC
funds have extremely short time horizons.45 They seek quick exits, generally
within three to seven years of initial investment.46 The ideal exits are IPOs or
sales to public companies.47
VC funding comes in stages.48 The expectation is that the start-up, if it
continues to be a worthwhile VC prospect, will require numerous rounds of
investment before it can successfully be exited.49 Future rounds can be funded
by participants in previous rounds (in the form of follow-on investments) or by
new VC backers.50 Each round often involves the participation of multiple VC
funds.51
Start-ups typically issue large amounts of incentive compensation, either
in the form of outright equity, such as restricted stock, or options.52 Oftentimes,
all service providers, not just the founders, will receive some form of equity
compensation.53 The result of all of these potential equity issuances—to
founders, friends and family, angels, multiple VC funds in each of several
rounds, and employees—is that a start-up might have one hundred or more direct
owners by the time of a successful exit. Furthermore, because VC funds
themselves have numerous owners, the start-up may ultimately have
significantly more indirect owners.54

42. Id. ¶ 105, at 1-8.
43. Id. ¶ 103, at 1-5.
44. Id. (noting the VC fund “requires a high return on successful investments to cover its losses suffered
on portfolio companies which fail . . . to provide a high compound internal rate of return (‘IRR’) on its aggregate
invested capital to compensate for the high risk of such investments”).
45. Id. ¶ 105.7, at 1-13 (“The PE/VC fund generally makes new investments into portfolio companies for
a limited period of time, e.g., 5 years after formation . . . .”).
46. Id. ¶ 102, at 1-3.
47. Id. ¶ 105.6, at 1-12.
48. See Morse & Allen, supra note 40, at 358 (noting that most start-up investing happens through staged
investment and control rights in order to finance the risky investments).
49. Bankman, supra note 1, at 1740 (“As those [design or manufacturing] milestones are reached, the
company applies for additional funding from its current investors and, if necessary, new investors.”).
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 8, ¶ 201, at 2-5 to 2-6; id. ¶ 201.7, at 2-10 (illustrating how start-ups issue
equity compensation).
53. See, e.g., Megan E. Richards, Windfall or Shortfall? Equity Compensation for Outside Service
Providers, MERCER CAPITAL: FIN. REPORTING BLOG (Sept. 19, 2016), https://mercercapital.com/
financialreportingblog/windfall-or-shortfall-equity-compensation-for-outside-service-providers (discussing the
trend of cash-strapped start-up companies offering equity to service providers).
54. Id.
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Start-ups tend to operate in the technology space or in other highly
competitive contexts, where being first-to-market is critical.55 Thus, while a
Main Street new business is akin to the proverbial slow-and-steady turtle, a startup is the boom-or-bust hare.
Finally, start-ups are expected to lose very large amounts of money, on
both an annual and overall basis, before the business becomes profitable. And,
the period to profitability is expected to be relatively long so that a business will
often be in a loss position at the time of an exit.56 This is consistent with the
high-risk, high-growth, and boom-or-bust characteristics already discussed.

55. Morse & Allen, supra note 40, at 358 (“Daring and ambitious start-up businesses, of the sort that have
fueled venture capital [] profits and built Silicon Valley’s brand, are more likely to embrace new or risky projects
with possibly enormous payoffs of global scope.” (footnote omitted)).
56. Id. at 377 (highlighting that the majority of successful outcomes in VC-backed start-ups occur after
year three).
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C. SUMMARY
The distinctions that are most relevant to the choice-of-entity puzzle are
summarized in the following chart:57
Main Street Small Businesses

Start-ups

Initial equity owners

Founders, friends & family
(F&F)

Founders, F&F, Angels, VC Funds

Follow-on equity
investments

None (funded by internal
growth or debt)

Numerous rounds, involving VC
funds

Types of equity owners

U.S. individuals

All types, including professional
and institutional investors

Incentive compensation
for non-founders

Cash bonuses

Equity (outright or options)

Number of equity owners

Handful

Can be quite numerous

Investment horizon
before exit

Permanent

3-7 years

Optimal exit strategy

N/A

IPO or strategic sale

Growth Strategy

Slow and steady

Extremely quick and large

Riskiness of the venture

Varies, but often not super-risky

Extremely risky

Importance of “first to
market”

Unimportant

Critical

Early losses?

Little, if any

Extremely large

Time to profitability

Expected to be relatively quick

Expected to be long, often much
longer than investment horizon of
investors

57. See infra Subparts III.A, III.B.
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III. TRADITIONAL EXPLANATIONS
Several prior commentators have attempted to solve the choice-of-entity
puzzle.58 Of the three primary benefits of partnership taxation discussed above
(single taxation of gains, flow-through of losses, and flexibility), these
commentators focused almost exclusively on the treatment of losses.59 Start-ups
typically realize large amounts of losses in the early years and will take many
years to realize overall net income.60 Furthermore, the vast majority of start-ups
will never realize overall net income because so many of them ultimately fail.61
Thus, at the time of the choice-of-entity decision, the prospect of net profits
seems far too speculative and remote to worry about how they might eventually
be taxed if and when, despite the extremely long odds, profits could actually
materialize.
In addition, even if profits are eventually realized, the profits may not be
taxed more favorably if the start-up is initially classified as a partnership, rather
than a corporation. Even successful start-ups are generally not significantly
profitable (on an overall basis) until after an IPO or sale to a public company.62
Since public companies are taxed as C corporations, most profits would
inevitably be taxed under the double-tax C corporation regime regardless of how
the entity was originally classified.63 In addition, because start-ups generally
continue to have high rates of growth even after exit, many, if not all, of the
profits in the foreseeable future would likely be plowed back into the business
(instead of being immediately distributed in the form of dividends), significantly
blunting the adverse impact from the second level of taxation.64 Accordingly,
even if the taxation of profits was, despite being so speculative and remote,
salient at the time of the choice-of-entity decision, it is not clear that initially
choosing partnership classification would actually save much, if any, taxes on
those profits.

58. See sources cited supra note 1.
59. See Bankman, supra note 1, at 1764–66 (“[T]he most common explanation for the industry structure
[is that] [a]ttention to tax benefits from early losses runs counter to the expansive mind-set of investors and
venture capitalists. ‘By their very nature,’ one lobbyist stated, ‘the kinds of people who are going into these
things are very optimistic people . . . .’”) (quoting a lobbyist for the VC industry); Fleischer, supra note 1, at 139
(arguing that “tax losses are not as valuable as they might seem . . . .”); Johnson, supra note 1, at 62 (“One
apologist for the Silicon Valley structures argues that ‘venture capital professionals who structure the deals do
not share personally in the losses, so they have little reason to care about the tax effects of the losses.’” (quoting
Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-Ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137, 139
(2003))).
60. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
61. See Morse & Allen, supra note 40, at 358 (“It is understood that a start-up probably will fail.”).
62. See Ben Eisen, No Profit? No Problem! Loss-Making Companies Flood the IPO Market, WALL ST.
J.: MONEYBEAT (Mar. 16, 2018, 4:20 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2018/03/16/spotify-and-dropboxto-join-a-growing-club-profitless-public-companies/ (explaining that 75% of start-ups who undergo an IPO are
not profitable on even an annual basis at the time of the IPO).
63. See I.R.C. § 7704 (2012).
64. See LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 8, ¶ 105.2, at 1-8 to 1-9 (describing growth-equity transactions in
which start-up companies use the new capital to expand the business).
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Alternatively, the prospect of losses is certain, immediate, and highly
salient. As mentioned above, start-ups lose money in the early years, often lots
and lots of it.65 An extreme example is Uber, which is still losing billions of
dollars every year.66 When a partnership suffers losses, those losses flow through
to the owners, who can (at least in theory) use them against other income.67
When a start-up corporation suffers losses, those losses create NOLs, which can
be used only if and when the corporation ultimately begins to generate annual
net income.68 The partnership treatment of losses seems so much better.69 So
why do start-ups routinely choose C corporation status?
A. THE PRESENCE OF TAX-INDIFFERENT OWNERSHIP
One seemingly obvious answer for why start-ups choose C corporation
status relates to the nature of the tax-indifferent owners of the start-ups. While
Main Street new businesses are generally owned by U.S. individuals who would
be able to use the early losses to shelter other income, start-ups are instead owned
for the most part by tax-exempt organizations and foreigners who cannot.70 A
majority of VC investment is made by these tax-indifferent investors, which
include charities, foundations, and foreign investors.71 Accordingly, any losses
realized by the VC funds would mostly be allocated to these investors, who,
because they are not subject to U.S. income taxes, would not benefit from
them.72
This scenario is further complicated by the fact that many of these taxindifferent investors flatly refuse to invest directly in a partnership that engages
in an active business.73 Tax-exempt investors generally avoid realizing unrelated
business taxable income (UBTI), while foreign investors avoid income
effectively connected with the United States. (ECI).74 If UBTI or ECI was
allocated to these investors, they would be required to file U.S. income tax
65. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Shubham Kalia & Subrat Patnaik, Uber’s Third-Quarter Net Loss Widens to $1.46 Billion:
Source, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2017, 7:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-results/ubers-third-quarternet-loss-widens-to-1-46-billion-source-idUSKBN1DT0BQ.
67. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
68. I.R.C. § 172.
69. See Bankman, supra note 1, at 1767 (“[The VC world is] shaped by tradition, idiosyncratic investor
preferences, and behavior that is hard to reconcile with any strong form of efficient market hypothesis.”); see
also Eric J. Allen & Sharat Raghavan, The Impact of Non-Tax Costs on the Tax-Efficiency of Venture Capital
Investments (2011 Am. Taxation Ass’n Midyear Meeting Paper: JLTR Conference, July 26, 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1759558 (demonstrating that VC funds are foregoing anywhere between $1.4 to $4.4
billion of present, after-tax cash savings).
70. LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 8, ¶ 106.3, at 1-15.
71. See Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Examining the Tax Advantage of Founders’ Stock, 97 IOWA
L. REV. 1085, 1105 (2012) (“Approximately half of private equity fund investment is made by parties that do
not pay U.S. taxes, such as pension funds, endowments, charitable foundations, and foreign persons and
entities.”).
72. LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 8, ¶ 1001.1, at 10-9 to 10-11.
73. See Goldberg, supra note 1, at 943 (“Tax-exempt investors tend to prefer the corporate form . . . .”).
74. LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 8, ¶ 1001.1, at 10-9.
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returns and to pay tax on that income.75 These investors generally loathe filing
U.S. tax returns, so they typically refuse to invest in VC funds that might require
them to do so.76 While allocations of net losses do not trigger UBTI or ECI,
eventual income (including gain recognized upon an exit of a flow-through
investment) would. To deal with the UBTI/ECI issue, VC funds interpose a
“blocker” C corporation into the structure between a partnership portfolio
company and the UBTI/ECI-sensitive investors.77
Blockers do not avoid the tax paying responsibility; they merely avoid the
tax reporting responsibility.78 Blockers report the UBTI/ECI income on their
own corporate tax returns and pay the resulting corporate tax.79 In an exit, the
blocker might be the vehicle taken public, its stock might be sold, or the blocker
might be merged on a tax-free basis into the buyer.80 The gains from the sale of
the blocker stock (or its successor in a tax-free merger) would not be UBTI/ECI
income because gains from the sale of stock are characterized as investment
(rather than business) income.81
The practical necessity of blockers for many VC investors may at first
glance seem to answer the puzzle. After all, if a C corporation is necessary within
the structure, why not just organize the start-up as a C corporation? In reality,
however, the necessity of blockers just raises more questions.
B. WHERE ARE THE TAXABLE INVESTORS?
In the start-up context, blockers are not very tax efficient. Early losses
allocated to blockers are trapped at the blocker level. Only if and when the
blocker recognizes net income in any given taxable year will those losses be
used to reduce taxable income and, correspondingly, corporate tax liability.82
This means that if the blocker never becomes profitable on an overall basis, some
or all of those losses will evaporate into thin air.83 Even if the blocker eventually

75. Id. ¶ 302.7, at 3-50; id. ¶ 1001.1, at 1-9.
76. Id.
77. Id. ¶ 1001.1, at 10-11.
78. BARTLETT, supra note 21, § 3.5A (“A foreign person is deemed to engage in the trade or business
conducted in the U.S. by any partnership in which that foreign person is directly (or indirectly through tiers of
partnerships) a partner. Every foreign person that engages in a trade or business (whether directly or indirectly
through one or more partnerships) becomes a U.S. taxpayer and like other U.S. taxpayers must file U.S. federal
income tax returns regardless of whether that person has any ECI or other income for a particular taxable year.”
(citations omitted)).
79. Crouch, supra note 25, at 210-14 to 210-15 (“Tax-exempt investors generally do not have any unrelated
business taxable income (“UBTI”) by owning stock in a corporation. . . . A foreign investor that owns stock in
a corporation generally is not subject to U.S. income tax with respect to the investment.”).
80. See LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 8, ¶ 105.6, at 1-12.
81. See id. ¶ 302.7, at 3–50 (explaining that a foreign investor can use a blocker to avoid direct exposure
to U.S. income tax); id. ¶ 512(b)(5) (excluding gains from UBTI).
82. Corporations only need to pay tax on income and not on losses.
83. Johnson, supra note 1, at 31 (discussing how start-up losses relating to research and development are
“trapped”).
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does become profitable on an overall basis, the time-value of money eats into
the value of the losses because of their delayed utilization.84
Recall that start-ups, even the relatively rare successful ones, lose lots of
money in the early years.85 In light of these losses and the tax inefficiency of
blockers, Professor Joseph Bankman argued in 1994 that the ideal investors in
VC funds would be taxable investors with large amounts of taxable income,
particularly profitable C corporations.86 Bankman focused on U.S. corporate
investors, and not U.S. individual investors, because C corporations are not
subject to the passive activity rules that apply to individuals.87 These passive
activity rules and their impact on the willingness of U.S. individuals to invest in
VC funds are discussed below.88
Bankman argued that corporate investors with lots of profits would be ideal
VC investors because they could use the large early losses to immediately shelter
some of their ordinary course income.89 This would mean that (1) the losses
would surely be utilized (because the corporations would have lots of ordinary
course income to offset) and (2) such utilization would be immediate.90 But in
practice, corporate investors rarely participate to a significant extent in VC funds
and their overall percentage of VC investment dollars is extremely low.91
Bankman tried to explain this piece of the puzzle, admittedly without reaching
a satisfying conclusion.92 His best guess was that the absence of corporate
investment was perhaps due to a combination of a corporate myopic focus on
financial accounting consequences (as opposed to real after-tax cash-flow
results) and path dependence by corporate and VC fund managers.93
This hard-to-explain phenomenon that Bankman observed nearly twentyfive years ago apparently has not changed and, in fact, may have become even
more perplexing.94 Since Bankman’s article, there has been tremendous growth
84. See Michael G. Cooper & Matthew J. Knittel, The Implications of Tax Asymmetry for U.S.
Corporations, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 33, 35 (2010) (explaining the erosion of the value of net operating losses caused
by delays in claiming carryforward deductions).
85. See supra Subpart II.B.
86. Bankman, supra note 1, at 1754–55.
87. Id. at 1753–54 (“In general, these [passive loss] rules limit the ability of individuals who invest in
businesses that they do not actively manage, ‘passive activities,’ from using flow-through losses from such
businesses to offset salary income, or investor-level income from portfolio investments such as stocks and
bonds.”). See generally I.R.C. § 469 (2012).
88. See infra Subpart III.D.3.
89. Bankman, supra note 1, at 1754.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1755 (“To put the matter somewhat differently, the presence of institutional and tax-constrained
investors may be the result, rather than the cause, of the present organizational structure.”).
92. Id. at 1766 (“There is no single answer to the riddle of start-up organization.”).
93. Id. at 1767 (“The price of stock is hypothesized to reflect after-tax return, and to therefore rise with tax
savings. In practice, many corporate decision-makers do not believe the market ‘looks-through’ financial
reporting. As a result, corporations appear to sacrifice tax benefits at the altar of reported earnings.”).
94. Cf. Understanding Venture Capital, FUNDERSCLUB, https://fundersclub.com/learn/guides/vc101/understanding-venture-capital/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) (noting that VC investment funding stems from
family offices, institutional investors (such as pensions, endowments, and sovereign wealth funds, and high networth individuals).
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in the VC industry.95 Yet, corporations by and large continue to decline to invest
significantly in VC funds.96 The remainder of this Article assumes that this will
continue.
C. WHERE TO INSERT THE BLOCKER?
The existence of tax-exempt and foreign investors necessitates the insertion
of a blocker between those investors and the start-up.97 When (as is common) a
start-up is formed as a corporation, the start-up effectively is the blocker.
Alternatively, each start-up can be formed as an LLC with a separate blocker
immediately above each LLC to block only the investors who need it, with the
remaining investors unblocked. Another option would be to have a “mothership”
blocker hold interests in all (or multiple) start-ups formed as LLCs. Finally,
given the ubiquity of tax-exempt and foreign investors in the U.S. public
company shareholder base, when U.S. public corporations invest in start-ups,
the investor is effectively the blocker.
1. The Investor as Blocker
Tax-exempts and foreigners own a significant portion of the equity in U.S.
public companies.98 When these public companies invest in VC funds and when
those VC funds invest in LLC start-ups, then the public company is effectively
serving as the blocker.99 This model was essentially what Bankman was
envisioning when he described the phenomenon of the missing corporate
investors.100 The benefit of “investor as blocker” is that early losses generated
by start-up investments could be used against all of the investor’s income and
gains, whether they are from ordinary business operations (for example, selling
widgets) or investments (for example, selling interests in successful start-ups).
In practice, there is relatively little corporate investment in start-ups,
whether through VC funds or directly.101 Instead, the blocker is almost always
inserted further down the ownership chain.102 The rationales for this are far from
obvious and were previously explored by Bankman.103
2.

Mothership Blocker

Once the possibility of large corporate investment in start-ups is taken off
the table, a mothership blocker structure might be considered. The mothership
95. See Kyle Stanford, The State of the US Venture Industry in 15 Charts, PITCHBOOK (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/the-state-of-the-us-venture-industry-in-15-charts.
96. See infra note 94.
97. See supra Subpart III.A.
98. See Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S. Corporate Stock,
151 TAX NOTES 923, 928–29 (2016).
99. See Bankman, supra note 1, at 1763.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 1759.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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blocker would own interests in many, if not all, of the start-up LLCs in which a
fund is invested.104 One benefit of this is that, if some of the start-ups were
profitable, while others were incurring losses, the profits could be absorbed by
the losses at the mothership blocker level. In the alternative “separate blockers”
structure, where each investment has its own blocker, no such netting is possible,
so profitable blockers pay full tax, while unprofitable blockers incur unusable
losses.
In practice, mothership blockers are not used.105 One potential explanation
is that start-up investments are all expected to generate losses (or at least none
of the start-ups are expected to have significant income) during the period they
are held by the VC fund.106 This means there would be little or no ordinary
business profits realized by the mothership blocker. But even though it is true
that there may be no ordinary business profits, there will likely be a very large
amount of profits realized upon the exits of the successful businesses. As
explained in detail below, one of the more subtle advantages of LLC
classification is that, upon such an exit, the transaction can be structured as an
asset sale.107 An asset sale gives the buyer a stepped-up basis (“SUB”) in the
LLC’s assets, which should increase the price the buyer is willing to pay by
about 20%.108 Delivering a SUB is normally prohibitively expensive for a
corporation, but not so for an LLC, as more fully described below.109 In the case
of a mothership blocker, when the few successful LLC start-ups are exited, the
blocker’s losses from all of its other investments could be used to absorb the
gains from the asset sales by LLCs.
Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, mothership blockers are not
common. Instead, a blocker is typically formed for each LLC investment or,
more commonly, the start-up itself is formed as a C corporation, which means
the start-up itself is effectively the blocker.
3. Separate Blockers for Each Start-Up
In the relatively rare cases where start-ups are organized as LLCs, a
separate blocker is usually formed for each start-up LLC investment.110 The
investors who need blockers invest through the blocker, while the other investors
make direct investments in the LLC.111 Upon exit, the blocked investors would
often sell the blocker stock, because a sale of the blocker’s assets would create
prohibitive tax consequences due to the double taxation of the gains, even

104. LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 8, ¶ 1001.1, at 10-11.
105. Id. (separate blocker generally formed for each LLC investment).
106. See supra Subpart II.B.
107. See infra Subpart IV.C.1.
108. See infra Subpart IV.C.1.
109. See infra Subpart IV.C.1.
110. LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 8, ¶ 1001.1, at 10-11.
111. John LeClaire & Jamie Hutchinson, Examining the ‘Blocker’,
https://www.privcap.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Examining-the-Blocker.pdf.

PRIVCAP

(2016),
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though the buyer should (in theory) pay a hefty premium for the assets.112
Alternatively, the blocker could be merged, on a tax-free basis, into the acquirer,
or the blocker vehicle could be taken public.
The separate blocker structure might appear to be less efficient than the
mothership structure for two interrelated reasons. First, all of the losses with
respect to failed start-ups would evaporate into thin air. Those losses would be
trapped in the separate blocker corporations, each of which has no income or
gains against which to use them. In the mothership structure, those losses could
absorb gains upon the exit of the relatively few successful structures. Second,
this cross-utilization of losses could allow exits of the successful ventures to be
structured as asset sales, rather than stock sales (or tax-free mergers). This would
give the buyer a SUB, which can result in an approximately 20% purchase price
premium.113
To compare the mothership and separate blocker structures, consider a VC
fund that makes twenty start-up investments of $1,000,000 each:
Investment #
(sales price)

Investment Total

Sales Proceeds Total

Gain or (Loss)

1-14 (busts)

$14,000,000

$0

($14,000,000)

15-16 (1x)

$2,000,000

$2,000,000

$0

17 (2x)

$1,000,000

$2,000,000

$1,000,000

18 (5x)

$1,000,000

$5,000,000

$4,000,000

19 (10x)

$1,000,000

$10,000,000

$9,000,000

20 (20x)

$1,000,000

$20,000,000

$19,000,000

Total

$20,000,000

$39,000,000

$19,000,000

If each of these investments was held by a separate blocker, the exits would
be structured as sales of the blocker interests, leaving the buyer with a carryover
basis instead of a SUB. The investors would walk away with $39,000,000
because the $19,000,000 capital gain on the sale of the blocker stock would not
be subject to tax. (It is assumed for the sake of simplicity that all of the investors
in the fund are tax-exempt or foreign and therefore all of the investments are
fully blocked and no taxes are imposed on capital gains.)
If a mothership blocker was used instead, the blocker could sell assets and
therefore would deliver SUBs to the buyer. Assuming a 20% premium for the
112. Id.
113. See infra Subpart IV.C.1.
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SUB, the aggregate sales proceeds would increase from $39,000,000 to
approximately $47,000,000. Assuming the blocker was capitalized with a 1:1
debt/equity ratio and the debt bore a 9% interest rate with an average maturity
of six years,114 the blocker would generate an aggregate interest deduction of
about $7,000,000. (The interest income received by the investors with respect to
the debt is neither UBTI nor ECI.) The overall corporate taxable income would
be $20,000,000 ($47,000,000 in total sales proceeds minus $20,000,000 for
research, development, and other miscellaneous costs deductions, and then less
$7,000,000 for interest), and the tax would equal $7,000,000, leaving the
investors with approximately $40,000,000. This is $1 million more than when
separate blockers were used. Thus, under these facts, the mothership blocker is
slightly more efficient.
Obviously, a change in the assumptions could drastically affect the
analysis. Most notably, the success of the fund is a critical input. Leaving all the
other assumptions constant, a fund with a 2.15x overall return (instead of a 1.95x
return) would be in roughly the same position whether or not it used a
mothership blocker or separate blockers.115 Funds that do better than 2.15x
would be better off using separate blockers. For example, for a fund with a 3x
return, separate blockers save roughly $4 million compared to using a
mothership. And a 5x fund would save $13 million, and a 10x fund $35 million.
For these very successful funds, the benefit of avoiding corporate tax on the
mothership’s net gain would be large enough to overcome the separate blocker
structure’s lack of SUB premiums on the winning investments and its inability
to cross-utilize the losses from the losing investments.
In short, the mothership blocker structure would marginally help VC funds
with middling performance. But good funds would generally be better off using
separate blockers, and outstanding funds would be much better off.116
4. The Start-Up as Blocker
As a final option, each start-up could itself serve as the blocker. In that
case, each start-up is organized as a separate corporation. This is the traditional
approach, and it still remains the standard start-up structure in Silicon Valley.
The difference between having the start-up itself as the blocker and having
a separate blocker for each LLC start-up is relevant only to investors who do not
require blockers (“unblocked investors”). Unblocked investors include U.S.
individuals, U.S. corporations, and certain tax-exempt organizations that are
exempt from the unrelated business income tax (“super tax-exempts”) and are
114. The example assumes that each LLC portfolio company was purchased by the blocker using 50% debt
proceeds and 50% equity proceeds and the average maturity period of each borrowing to purchase a portfolio
company was six years.
115. Let x be the equivalent COB purchase price. x = 1.2x – [(1.2x -27).35]. Using the assumptions above,
x = 43. An investment of 20 yielding 43 is a 2.15x return.
116. Another problem is the dividend withholding tax with respect to foreign investors upon periodic
distributions from the mothership. In the separate blocker structure, blocker stock is sold upon each successful
exit, resulting in capital gain rather than dividend income, so the withholding tax does not apply.
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therefore not concerned with realizing UBTI.117 The potential benefits these
unblocked investors would receive, by investing in an LLC start-up as opposed
to a corporate start-up, are threefold. First, any income realized is taxed once
and only once.118 Second, any losses that are realized flow through the LLC,
instead of being trapped in a corporate entity.119 Third, upon a successful exit,
the unblocked investors can efficiently deliver a SUB to the buyer, which should
increase the price that the buyer is willing to pay to those investors by
approximately 20%.120 This third benefit can be thought of as merely a specific
application of the first benefit. If the start-up was a corporation, the gain on the
sale of assets to the buyer would be prohibitively expensive. This is because the
immediate double tax burden borne would exceed the purchase price premium.
The unique ability of LLCs to efficiently deliver SUBs to buyers is discussed in
much greater detail below.121
In most start-up situations, the second and third benefits are the only
potentially relevant ones. The first is largely irrelevant because start-ups are not
typically expected to generate ordinary business profits (on an overall basis)
before they are exited. Because exits normally involve the start-up becoming, or
being acquired by, a public company, those business profits, if and when they
are realized, will inevitably be subject to the double tax regime. On the other
hand, start-ups are expected to realize lots of losses before they are exited. In
addition, successful exits are expected to result in large gains, with “home runs”
resulting in monumental gains.
D. TREATMENT OF THE UNBLOCKED INVESTORS
When a start-up is formed as an LLC, only unblocked investors get the two
benefits described above (loss flow through and the ability to deliver a SUB to
a buyer). When the start-up is formed as a corporation, those benefits are denied
to all investors. This Subpart explains the unblocked investors’ benefits in detail.
1. Super Tax-Exempts
State and local governments, as well as Indian tribes, are immune from
UBIT under § 115 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).122 In addition, pension
funds for state and local employees often interpret § 115 to provide the same
immunity for themselves.123
117. Eric M. Elfman et al., Corporate Tax Issues in Private Equity, A.B.A., at 26 (Jan. 23, 2014),
https://beta.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/taxation/taxiq/mid14/taxiq-14mid-ct-taxissues-huckslides.pdf.
118. Id. at 11.
119. See discussion of loss flow-through supra Subpart I.B.
120. See discussion of SUB premium infra Subpart IV.C.1.
121. See infra Subpart IV.C.
122. I.R.C. § 115 (2012).
123. See Calvin H. Johnson & Ellen P. Aprill, UBIT to the Defense! ESOPs and Government Entities, 128
TAX NOTES 317, 318 (2010) (“Pension funds for state and local employees have also claimed immunity from
UBIT, relying at least in part on section 115, although it is not clear that they were all entitled to immunity on
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Accordingly, these types of investors can invest directly in a start-up LLC
without worrying about UBIT consequences. Because these investors do not pay
income tax, the loss flow-through benefit is nil. Instead, the major benefit is that,
upon exit, these investors can sell their share of the start-up’s assets, whereas
blocked investors must, as a practical matter, sell blocker stock.124 This allows
the super tax-exempts to deliver a SUB and receive a corresponding premium in
the sales price. Because super tax-exempts do not pay taxes, the after-tax benefit
from receiving the SUB premium would equal the pre-tax premium.125
2. Domestic Corporate Investors
Domestic corporations can easily invest directly in LLC start-ups. And, as
explained above, corporate investors that have significant profits are
theoretically the ideal VC investors because they can immediately utilize the
large losses thrown off by LLC start-ups.126 And, when the start-up investment
is exited, they can receive the roughly 20% SUB premium on the purchase price
of their interest.127 Because the corporate investor would pay tax on all of the
gain (including the premium), the after-tax benefit of the premium would be
approximately 13% (under the historical 35% corporate tax rates).128 As
previously discussed, significant domestic corporate investment in start-ups is
relatively rare.129
However, it should be noted that one of the underappreciated problems
with using partnerships relates to tax compliance, which is discussed extensively
in Subpart IV.A. Compliance concerns would create particular problems for
large public companies who must regularly prepare and file up-to-date financial
statements. These practical compliance concerns could help explain some of the
unattractiveness of corporate investment in start-ups, notwithstanding its tax
efficiency.

that basis.”); Andrew W. Needham & Anita Beth Adams, Private Equity Funds, TAX MGMT. (BNA) 735-3d,
VIII.A.2.b. (“Most pension funds organized for the benefit of state and local government employees (including
employees of governmental affiliates) claim complete immunity from tax, relying at least in part on § 115. It is
not entirely clear, however, that such income is derived from the exercise of an essential governmental function,
accrues to a state or political subdivision (rather than the employees) or does not benefit private interests.”); see
also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2015-37-019 (Sept. 11, 2015) (holding that I.R.C § 115 covers multiple employer trusts
established to enable public-agency employers to fund post-retirement employee benefits); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2015-16-031 (Apr. 17, 2015); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2015-15-016 (Apr. 10, 2015).
124. See discussion of SUB premium infra Subpart IV.C.
125. If the portfolio company was structured as a corporation, a buyer might pay a premium for the
company’s net operating loss carryforwards. However, the SUB premium received for selling an LLC should
exceed the value of the existing NOL carryforwards.
126. See supra Subpart III.B.
127. See discussion of SUB premium infra Subpart IV.C.
128. 20% SUB premium x (1 – .35) = 13%.
129. See supra Subpart III.B.
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Individual U.S. Investors

Individual investors often invest in VC funds, though the extent of their
investment can vary dramatically from fund to fund.130 Individuals may invest
in a variety of ways. Individual VC fund managers are often required to
personally invest a small percentage (usually 1 to 10%) of the capital to give the
investors comfort that they have some “skin in the game.”131 Individual VC fund
managers also receive carried interest, which entitles them to a percentage of the
fund’s profits (usually 20%).132 Occasionally, wealthy individuals or families
invest either directly in VC funds or in a pooled investment vehicle made up of
individual owners.133 For example, a fund of funds receives capital from high
net worth individuals and makes investments in VC or other private funds.134
The fund of funds allows for greater diversification, which may be difficult for
some investors to achieve due to high minimum capital commitments of the
investee funds.135
Regarding the loss flow-through benefit, only capital investors (and not
carried interest holders) are allocated net losses, because carried interest holders
only participate in net gains.136 Individual capital investors bear net losses and,
accordingly, will be allocated a share of them. These net losses will be
characterized as passive activity losses (“PALs”) unless the investor materially
participates in the LLC’s activities, which would be rare.137 Until a particular
activity is exited completely by the investor (for example, in a complete
disposition of an LLC interest), PALs from the activity may only be used to
absorb passive activity gains.138 As the vast majority of start-ups will generate
losses until they are either exited or abandoned, in practice this rule delays the
utilization of PALs until those events because there are no passive activity gains
except upon exit. This delayed utilization of PALs reduces the value of the flowthrough losses due to the time-value of money.139
Another burden from PAL characterization is that, in the hands of some
individual investors in start-ups, the losses may end up being utilized to soak up

130. Understanding Venture Capital, FUNDERSCLUB, https://fundersclub.com/learn/guides/vc101/understanding-venture-capital/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
131. PREQIN, PREQIN SPECIAL REPORT: PRIVATE CAPITAL FUND TERMS 11 (2016),
http://docs.preqin.com/reports/Preqin-Special-Report-Private-Capital-Fund-Terms-November-2016.pdf
(showing median general partner commitments of approximately 2% and mean general partner commitments of
approximately 5% for all private equity funds).
132. LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 8, ¶ 102, at 1-3.
133. Cf. Subpart III.A (explaining that the majority of private equity investment is made by institutional or
foreign investors).
134. Venture Capital, BUS. BROKERAGE GROUP, https://www.businessbrokeragegroup.com/venturecapital/venture-capital (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
135. Id.
136. LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 8, ¶ 102, at 1-3.
137. I.R.C. § 469 (2012).
138. Id.
139. See generally Daniel S. Goldberg, The Passive Activity Loss Rules: Planning Considerations,
Techniques, and a Foray into Never-Never Land, 15 J. REAL EST. TAX’N 3 (1987).
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capital gains, which are taxed at approximately half the rate of ordinary
income.140 For example, assume an investor realizes $1,000,000 of PALs in each
of Years 1 through 5 and then in Year 6 realizes a $10,000,000 long-term capital
gain, which constitutes a passive activity gain. If the investor has a relatively
small amount of ordinary income (such as compensation) in Year 6, the
$5,000,000 PALs from Years 1 through 5 would mostly absorb the capital gain
recognized in Year 6. The overall effect of the PAL limitation in such a case is
the conversion of the PALs from ordinary losses to a capital loss (as well as the
more obvious deferral of losses from Years 1 through 5 until Year 6).
The PAL rules therefore delay suspended losses and potentially effectively
convert their character to capital losses. This is similar to what would have
happened if the start-up was initially formed as a corporation. In that case,
instead of realizing annual PALs, the investor includes his investment in his
stock basis. If the start-up fails, the stock will be worthless and the investors will,
at the time of worthlessness, realize a long-term capital loss equal to their stock
basis. If the start-up succeeds, the stock will be sold and, at the time of the sale,
the investors will, at the time of the sale, use the stock basis to offset their longterm capital gain recognized on the sale.
Accordingly, the PAL rules effectively can erode much, if not all, of the
benefit of flow-through losses for individuals. However, there may still be some
benefit in some situations. If the investor has significant ordinary income, the
PALs would offset that high-rate income when they are released. In addition,
PALs are released when any passive activity gains are generated (to the extent
of those gains), regardless of whether the gains stem from the same investments
that generated the PALs.141 On the other hand, basis in stock is recovered only
when that particular stock is sold or becomes worthless.142 To illustrate these
points, assume that an investor invests $1 million in five different investments,
resulting in $1 million of PALs in each of Years 1 through 5. In Year 6, one of
the investments is sold for $10 million. In Year 7, the other four investments
become worthless.

140. See I.R.C. § 1 (providing a maximum 37% rate on ordinary income and a 20% rate on long-term capital
gains).
141. See id. § 469(a)–(b).
142. See id. § 1001(a) (requiring a realization event, such as a sale or exchange, before a loss is realized);
see also id. § 165(g) (treating the worthlessness of a security as a deemed sale).
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Investment

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

Total

Amount
invested

$1 million

$1 million

$1 million

$1 million

$1 million

$5 million

Losses in
Years 1
through 5 (all
PALs)

($1 million)

($1 million)

($1 million)

($1 million)

($1 million)

($5 million)

Year 6 Exit

Sold for
$10M

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Year 7

N/A

Worthless

Worthless

Worthless

Worthless

N/A

Under the PAL rules, the $5 million of PALs from all the investments are
released in Year 6, and they reduce the investor’s capital gain on the exit from
$10 million to $5 million.143 Assuming a 20% capital gains rate, the investor
would be left with $9 million in cash ($10 million cash proceeds less $1 million
capital gains tax) in Year 6. In Year 7, when the four other investments become
worthless, there are no tax consequences.144
If all the investments were instead structured as corporations, the sales
price of investment #1 needs to be adjusted. Because the start-up is a
corporation, the sale would have to be structured as a sale of stock, which means
the buyer will not pay the SUB premium.145 Thus, the purchase price should be
(assuming a 20% SUB premium) $8.33 million rather than $10 million.146
However, to isolate the impact of the PAL rules, assume that the purchase price
of investment #1 remains $10 million. In that case, the gain recognized will be
$9 million and the tax due $1.8 million, resulting in $8.2 million in after-tax
cash. The worthlessness of the other investments in Year 7 will result in $4
million of capital losses realized in that year. The results are summarized below:

143.
144.
145.
146.

This assumes that the investor has no ordinary income in Year 6.
This is because the losses from Investments 2 through 5 were used in Year 6.
See discussion of SUB premium infra Subpart IV.C.1.
$8.33 million x 1.2 = $10 million.
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Year(s)

Flow-Through

Corporate

Difference

1-5

No tax consequences

No tax consequences

None

6

$5M capital gain; $9
million after-tax cash

$9 capital gain; $8.2M
after-tax cash

Corporate investment
reduces after-tax cash by
$800K

7

No tax consequences

$4M long-term capital
losses

Corporate investment
provides $4M more longterm capital losses

In general, the flow-through consequences are marginally better. If the
capital losses from worthlessness in Year 7 can be used immediately to offset
capital gains otherwise taxed at 20%, there is only a one-year acceleration of the
utilization of the $4 million of losses from Investments 2 through 5. If the
utilization of the Year 7 capital losses is delayed beyond year 7, the time-value
benefit grows.
In summary, in the context of taxable individual investors, the PAL
limitations restrict the ability to use flow-through losses in such a way that the
benefit of flow-through losses, relative to trapped losses, is often insignificant.
Thus, the benefit of loss flow-through to individual investors is generally not an
important factor in entity classification.
More important than flow-through losses is the LLC’s unique ability to
deliver a SUB in successful exits, which is discussed below.147 The SUB
delivery should theoretically result in a premium equal to roughly 20% of the
value of successful exits.148 Since the premium would result in additional capital
gain, the after-tax premium for individual investors would equal roughly 16%
of the equivalent COB purchase price.149 No such premium is available if the
start-up is structured as a corporation.

147. See infra Subpart IV.C.1.
148. See discussion of SUB premium infra Subpart IV.C.1.
149. 20% assumed SUB premium x (1 – 20% long-term capital gains) = 16%.
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Summary of Tax Benefits from LLC Versus Corporate Start-Up
Investments

The following chart summarizes the above conclusions:
Type of Investor

Benefit from Loss
Flow-Through (relative
to corporate
classification)

Theoretical Benefit
from Delivering SUB
(expressed as a
premium to equivalent
COB purchase price &
in after-tax terms)

Comments

Blocked Investors
(foreign & most taxexempts)

None (blocked)

None (must deliver
blocker stock)

Super Tax-Exempts

None (no tax
responsibilities)

20 percent premium

No tax on premium

U.S. Corporations

Immediate utilization of
losses to shelter 35% rate
income

13 percent

35 percent corporate
tax applied on
premium

U.S. Individuals

PAL rules significantly
reduce their benefit

16 percent

20 percent tax on
capital gains applied
to premium

Accepting as true the reluctance of U.S. corporations to significantly
participate in VC investments, the only significant benefit of LLC classification
is the ability to generate a SUB premium.
E.

OTHER IDENTIFIED FACTORS SUPPORTING THE CORPORATE CHOICE

The existing literature has identified other factors that push in favor of the
corporate form for start-ups. Some have noted that LLCs were historically far
less familiar than corporations.150 This differential has eroded to some extent
now that LLCs have been around for over forty years.151 The familiarity gap is
perhaps most salient with respect to incentive compensation. While corporations
issue ubiquitous stock options, LLCs typically issue far more obscure profits
interests.152 Profits interests are economically very similar to stock options, and
150. See Bankman, supra note 1, at 1751 (quoting one venture capitalist as saying: “Management gets
spooked by partnership interests.”).
151. See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 173 (noting that “the first LLC statute was passed in 1977 [in
Wyoming]”).
152. See Polsky & Hellwig, supra note 71, at 1105 (discussing profits interests in the private equity and VC
fund context).
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in fact, can yield better tax consequences for holders.153 However, VC experts
understand that start-up employees place a higher value on stock options than
on functionally equivalent profits interests because options are so much more
prevalent and familiar.154
In addition, IPO exits are marginally “smoother” for corporations.155 As
public firms are generally subject to the corporate tax regardless of their tax
classification and the public market prefers the corporate form, LLCs that go
public generally first need to convert to a corporation.156 However, starting as
an LLC puts only a grain or two of sand in the gears during the going-public
process. Tax-free conversion from an LLC to a corporation will in most cases
involve a relatively simple set of corporate transactions.157 In 1994, Bankman
estimated these transaction costs to be no more than $200,000,158 which in
today’s dollars would approximate $350,000.159 Even if the costs were as high
as $500,000, this amount would commonly pale in comparison to the benefit of
being able to deliver a SUB. For instance, assuming 40% of a start-up is owned
by unblocked investors (including founders, super-tax exempts, and VC fund
managers), a 20% SUB premium, and a $1 billion pre-IPO valuation, the SUB
premium would equal $80,000,000.
Exits other than IPOs can likewise be marginally easier for corporations.
In a strategic sale to a public company buyer with all or nearly all of the
consideration paid in the form of buyer stock, the transaction can easily be
structured as a tax-free merger if the start-up is a corporation.160 If the start-up
is an LLC, the same transaction would now be typically structured as a so-called
“Up-C,” which is a relatively new transaction structure that provides even better
tax consequences than a tax-free merger, but with some significant additional
complexity and transaction costs.161
153. See Goldberg, supra note 1, at 938 (“One could fashion a similar plan creating options (nonqualified
only) to purchase partnership/LLC interests.”); cf. id. at 939 (noting that the “granting of a capital interest in a
partnership . . . does not deal with the consequences to a partnership that was already in existence” and
discussing the complexity of “revaluation of its assets and provid[ing] special allocations of gain . . . to reflect
in each old and new partner’s capital account”); Bankman, supra note 1, at 1752–53 (discussing that if employees
received partnership interests, they would be treated as being a “partner for tax purposes” which would
“complicate[] tax filings and impose[] some additional legal and accounting fees on the venture and the
employee”). “Unit options,” options on LLC units that are functionally equivalent to stock, while theoretically
possible, are disfavored by tax experts because it is not clear how they are taxed, and there is the possibility of
quite unfavorable (and counterintuitive) tax results upon exercise of those options.
154. See Goldberg, supra note 1, at 943 (“Perhaps [granting partnership interests], while theoretically sound,
ignores an important perception—stock options may be a means of attracting young high-tech but financially
unsophisticated employees, ready to overvalue the options as compensation and therefore accept less cash
compensation than the actual value of the options would warrant.”).
155. Fleischer, supra note 1, at 175.
156. See id. at 177–82.
157. See generally LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 8.
158. Bankman, supra note 1, at 1750.
159. See U.S. Inflation Rate, $200,000 in 1994 to 2018, CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR,
http://www.in2013dollars.com/1994-dollars-in-2018?amount=200000 (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
160. See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 182–83.
161. See generally Polsky & Rosenzweig, supra note 2.
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IV. UNDERAPPRECIATED FACTORS ENCOURAGING CORPORATE
CLASSIFICATION
The previous Part described the traditional explanations for why start-ups
prefer the corporate form. These explanations focused on the presence of taxindifferent investors, the absence of corporate investors, loss limitations
imposed on individual investors, and unfamiliarity and additional transaction
costs associated with the use of LLCs.162
However, two significant factors, both of which push in favor of corporate
classification, have thus far been tremendously underappreciated. First, the
unique nature of flow-through taxation creates numerous compliance and
transaction complications that are not present in the corporate context.163 While
previous commentators have mentioned complexity as a factor, they did not
appreciate its significance or explore the true sources of the complications.164
Second, while in theory the most significant benefit of using the LLC form is
the ability to deliver a SUB to the buyer, which should pay a premium for it,
there is significant skepticism about whether buyers in typical exits of start-ups
are actually willing to pay such a premium.165 Thus, the administrative problems
of using an LLC have been understated, while a significant benefit—the ability
to fetch a SUB premium—is missing in the start-up context.
A. COMPLIANCE AND COMPLEXITY
The existing literature, while recognizing that corporations are more simple
than LLCs, has misunderstood the real sources and key impacts of LLC-related
complexity. Numerous and cascading K-1s, exceptionally high failure rates,
disorderly liquidations, and transactional complexity combined with the fastpaced, cookie-cutter, and cash-poor early stage VC environment make
widespread use of LLCs extremely impractical.
1.

Existing Literature

Prior commentators have noted some additional compliance and
complexity costs associated with LLCs. Professor Joseph Bankman, in the first
academic article to explore the puzzle of why start-ups are formed as
corporations, explained that “the formation of the start-up as a corporation
minimized legal and organizational costs,” though he characterized these costs
as “hardly the most significant” factor in explaining the preference for startups.166 Bankman then discussed the costs of a conversion to a corporation upon
exit, which were addressed above, and which he admitted were not significant
enough to justify initially choosing the corporate form.167
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See supra Part III.
See infra Subpart IV.A.
See infra Subpart IV.A.
See infra Subpart IV.C.
Bankman, supra note 1, at 1749.
Id. at 1750.
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Professor Victor Fleischer, in a more extensive discussion, also addressed
complexity and compliance concerns.168 He noted that incentive compensation
in the LLC context, which is typically delivered through profits interests or even
as options on membership interests, was more complicated and less familiar to
service providers than their corporate analog, stock options.169 Fleischer also
explained that service providers that are equity owners are not considered
employees for tax purposes; meaning that they are required to make estimated
tax payments, rather than simply rely on wage withholding as employees are
able to do.170 He also described some corporate governance and drafting
concerns due to the relative novelty, as well as management flexibility, of LLCs
compared to corporations.171 Like Bankman, Fleischer also discussed the
relatively smoother exit mechanisms for corporations vis-à-vis LLCs.172
Professor Calvin Johnson also mentioned complexity issues, although only
briefly.173 He noted that start-up lawyers were more familiar with corporations
and had, at their fingertips, standardized corporate forms that could be reused
time and time again with just a little bit of individualization.174
These discussions of compliance and complexity problems were accurate
at the time they were written, and for the most part remain so today, though
familiarity with the LLC form continues to grow.175 However, these discussions
missed the real sources of the compliance and complexity problems that make
the LLC form particularly unwieldly for Silicon Valley start-ups.
2. K-1s, K-1s, and More K-1s
The existing literature has focused on additional complications relating to
compensation design, exit structures, and the relative novelty of LLCs.176
However, as discussed below, there are other much more significant compliance
and complexity problems that have not previously been fully explored: for
example, the Form K-1.
Partnerships are required to issue K-1 forms annually to each and every of
their partners, regardless of whether the partnership generate profits or losses.177
The K-1s inform each partner of the partner’s share of the partnership’s items of
taxable income, gain, deduction, or loss, as well as the tax character of such

168. See Fleischer, supra note 1.
169. Id. at 140 (“Organizing as a corporation minimizes legal costs and simplifies employee compensation
and exit strategy.”).
170. Id. at 169.
171. Id. at 174–76.
172. Id. at 176.
173. Johnson, supra note 1, at 42.
174. Id. at 60–61 (“Businessmen reuse the same templates and structures, even the same standardized forms,
to save legal fees and to avoid the hard work of figuring out new business structures, even when the templates
do not fit perfectly.”).
175. See sources cited supra note 1.
176. See supra notes 166–175.
177. I.R.C. § 702 (2012).
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items (for example, long-term capital gain).178 The partners then include
information from the K-1 on their own income tax returns.179 Accordingly, every
taxpayer who is a partner in a partnership must receive a K-1 from each and
every partnership in which the taxpayer is an owner, before the taxpayer can
properly prepare her own return.180
Even in a simple scenario where a taxpayer owns an interest in a small
handful of partnerships, this can pose a significant compliance problem. Partners
in partnerships must routinely file for extensions of time to file their returns
because they have yet to receive all of their K-1s, or because of the possibility
that amended K-1s might be issued.181 In cases where upper tier partnerships
own interests in lower tier partnerships, the upper tier partnerships cannot file
its tax returns and issue its K-1s to its partners until all of the lower tier
partnerships have filed their own tax returns and issued their own K-1s.182 It
does not take much imagination to see how this can cause serious compliance
headaches. In the start-up context, however, these garden variety K-1 problems
are made exponentially worse for three main reasons.
First, the number of K-1s that would need to be issued if all start-ups were
commonly formed as LLCs would be significant. Many taxable investors in
start-ups will own direct (for example, angel investments) or indirect interests,
through partnerships (for example, VC fund investments), in a large number of
start-ups.183 If many of these start-ups were structured as LLCs, investors (or
funds in which they are invested) might have to receive dozens, if not hundreds,
of K-1s every year before they can even begin preparing their own tax returns.
If a single one of the K-1s is missing, erroneous, or delayed, it will complicate
the investor’s tax compliance. For instance, if a single one of those K-1s is issued
or amended after the investor has filed its own return, the investor would have
to file an amended return incorporating the newly corrected information.184
Second, because VC funds are themselves partnerships, there would be
cascading K-1 problems. When an LLC start-up is owned in part by a VC fund,
the LLC is a lower tier partnership to the upper tier VC partnership. This means
that, before the VC fund could file its own tax return, it would have to first
178. See 2017 Partner’s Instructions for Schedule K-1 (Form 1065), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1065sk1.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Arden Dale, Late Tax Returns Common for the Wealthy, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2013, 9:33 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324000704578390281633525610 (noting the main culprit
stopping wealthy taxpayers from filing their return is the “Form K-1”).
182. Id.
183. Tax-exempt investors will invest through one or more blockers. Typically, a separate blocker is set up
for each investment. Therefore, the blocker would need to receive a K-1 only from one partnership before it
could file its own return.
184. See, e.g., Tax Information Center: Correcting Schedule K-1 for Your Business, H&R BLOCK,
https://www.hrblock.com/tax-center/irs/forms/correcting-schedule-k-1-for-your-business/ (last visited Jan. 19,
2019) (answering an individual’s question by noting that they must file an amended return if the individual
receives a corrected K-1).
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receive K-1s from all of its investee start-ups. Taxable investors in VC funds
then must wait to receive K-1s from all of the VC funds in which they are
invested before the investor can file her own tax returns. Making matters worse,
funds of funds are major investors in VC funds.185 Funds of funds are themselves
structured as partnerships and typically invest in over ten VC funds.186 For funds
of funds (FOF), there would actually be three tiers of partnerships—the FOF
partnership on top, the VC funds in the middle, and the start-up LLCs on the
bottom. Any delay or error relating to any one of the start-up LLC’s K-1s will
have ripple-through repercussions all the way up the chain of partnerships.
Third, the nature of start-up investments is such that the overwhelming
majority of start-ups will completely fail. In early stage VC funds, the failure
rate can easily approach or even exceed 90%, even for funds that are highly
successful overall.187 Failing and failed start-ups that are LLCs must still issue
K-1s, and investors must await those K-1s before they can properly file their
own tax returns. Once it becomes clear that a start-up is failing—usually because
it is quickly burning through its cash with the next round of financing becoming
more and more unlikely—the start-up’s employees will often flee the company,
seeking work at another start-up or looking for a “soft landing” at a large
company.188 Orderly liquidations of failing start-ups are unusual, because a
failed start-up often has little in the way of salvageable assets. For instance, the
start-up might have technology that simply did not work, never became
marketable, or has become obsolete, and it just closes up shop.189 In contrast,
non-start-up businesses often have property (such as real estate or equipment)
that has some salvage value, resulting in a more orderly liquidation process.
Accordingly, when a start-up is dying, it will often be the case that nobody
will be around, or have any financial incentive, to assist in properly preparing
and filing the start-up’s tax returns and K-1s. As a result, it is highly likely that
failing start-ups either could not or would not issue timely and accurate K-1s to
their investors, complicating tax compliance for them or their own investors.
A taxable investor might respond to this situation by simply filing a tax
return without incorporating the investor’s share of the failing start-up’s tax
items, which normally would just include losses. However, that would result in
unclaimed losses, and loss flow-through is precisely one of the benefits of
185. See, e.g., Approach, DARWIN VENTURES, http://www.darwinvc.com/approach/ (last visited Jan. 19,
2019).
186. See Funds of Funds Investing, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/exam-guide/cfa-level1/alternative-investments/fund-of-funds-investing.asp (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) (“Ordinarily, a fund of funds
is structured as a limited partnership.”).
187. See Sebastian Quintero, Dissecting Startup Failure Rates by Stage, MEDIUM (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://towardsdatascience.com/dissecting-startup-failure-by-stage-34bb70354a36 (showing an ultimate failure
rate of 97% for seed investees and 89% for Series A investees).
188. See Marisa Kendall, When Startups Fail, Employees and Customers Are Often Hit Hard, STAR (Oct.
8, 2016), https://www.thestar.com/business/2016/10/08/when-startups-fail-employees-and-customers-areoften-hit-hard.html (describing the often chaotic failures of startups).
189. See Emma McGowan, The 13 Top Reasons Why Startups Fail, STARTUPS.CO (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.startups.co/articles/why-do-startups-fail.
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choosing the LLC form in the first place. In addition, it remains possible for a
failed or failing start-up to actually realize gain. If a failing LLC has outstanding
debt, the cancellation of that debt generally triggers income that must be
recognized and allocated to its owners.190 In that case, simply ignoring the LLC’s
tax items can result in the investor underpaying taxes.
These compliance problems do not arise when start-ups are formed as
corporations.191 While investors in partnerships are directly affected tax-wise,
for better or for worse, by the activities of their investees, investors in
corporations are completely insulated.192 Whatever happens “down below” in
the investee corporation does not affect the investor’s tax return at all.193 Of
course, if cash or property is distributed by a corporation to the investor, that
often results in tax consequences for the investor, such as the realization of
dividend income.194 But the investor will well know whether and to what extent
she received a distribution. Alternately, being a partner in a partnership requires
knowledge of what has occurred below at the investee level, regardless of
whether any distributions have been made.195
3. The Nature of Early Stage Start-Up Investing
These compliance problems become even more problematic once the
unique nature of early stage start-up investing is considered. The initial choice
of entity decision is made very early.196 It can be made by the founders even
before any outside investment is received.197 Or, it can be made around the time
that seed investors—friends and family or angels—arrive on the scene.198
Certainly, by the time a VC fund has actually made a Series A investment, a
choice of entity decision has been made.
The problems stemming from K-1s and high failure rates are significantly
exacerbated at the seed or Series A investment stage. Compared to their later
stage counterparts, angels and early stage VC funds make smaller dollar

190. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(11), 702(a) (2012).
191. See William C. Brown, A Primer on Income Tax Compliance for Multistate Pass-Through Entities and
Their Owners, 67 TAX LAW. 821, 871 (discussing the greater tax compliance problems of flow-throughs
compared to C corporations).
192. Id. (“Since a C corporation pays all of the taxes on its business income directly, no reporting of
corporate income to shareholders is required by the tax code.”).
193. See id.
194. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (including dividends received in gross income).
195. In addition, if a failing corporation realizes cancellation of debt income, income will generally be
excluded because the corporation is insolvent. In the corporate context, insolvency is determined at the corporate
level, and a failing corporation will typically be insolvent. In contrast, the insolvency exclusion is applied in the
partnership context at the partner level, so cancellation of debt income will flow through to the partners even if
the partnership itself is insolvent.
196. See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 137 (“A typical start-up is organized as a corporation under state
law . . . .”).
197. Id.
198. See Goldberg, supra note 1, at 923 (discussing the “angel investors’” preference for corporate form
because they view “the tax advantages of LLCs as more theoretical than real”).
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investments in a larger number of start-ups.199 In addition, early stage
investments are riskier because, by definition, later stage investments have
already proven worthy of a subsequent round of investment.200 Furthermore,
early stage investments that fail often do so most completely, burning through
all their cash with little or no salvageable value to show for it.201
Each of these factors exacerbates the K-1 compliance problems. The larger
the number of investments by a VC fund, the more K-1s it must receive before
the fund can file its own tax return. More failed investments and more complete
failures increase the risk that failing and failed start-ups will not issue timely and
accurate K-1s.
In addition, while an initial choice of entity decision can in theory be
changed, it is generally too costly from a tax perspective to convert from a
corporation to a partnership after a start-up begins to show promise.202 A
conversion from a corporation to a partnership requires an actual or constructive
liquidation of the corporation, which triggers an immediate double taxation of
the corporation’s net built-in gain at the time of the conversion.203 Accordingly,
an initial choice of corporate classification is, for all intents and purposes,
permanent,204 even though a conversion from a partnership to a corporation is
typically easy.205
In summary, in early stage VC investment, many small seeds are planted,
with the expectation that almost all of them will never bear any fruit at all.206
The K-1 compliance issues that would result from this state of affairs push early
stage investors to require that their investees are corporations (or convert to
corporate status) as a condition of their investment. When a small number of
these seeds begin to show promise, such that compliance problems are reduced,
it is simply too late to convert them to LLC status.
4. Transactional Complexity
Existing commentary has noted that lawyers who deal with start-up
investment, whether representing founders or investors, are more familiar with
corporate documentation, such as articles of incorporation, bylaws, and

199. See supra Subpart II.B.
200. See Morse & Allen, supra note 40, at 358.
201. See id. at 377.
202. See LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 8, ¶ 302.2.2, at 3-38 (noting that a partnership cannot be party to a
§ 368 reorganization and discussing why the conversion would trigger an unsavory taxable gain for most
owners).
203. See generally I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-01-029 (Jan. 3, 1997) (noting that a state law merger of a C
corporation into an LLC is a taxable liquidation under I.R.C. § 331 and will not qualify for nonrecognition
treatment).
204. See supra text accompanying note 202.
205. See generally Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88 (noting that in most cases, § 351 would allow for
nonrecognition of the built-in gain within the partnership at the time of conversion).
206. See Morse & Allen, supra note 40, at 376.
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shareholders’ agreements, than with their LLC counterparts.207 Previous
commentators have also described the less mature body of state law regarding
LLCs.208 Commentators have also discussed the additional flexibility afforded
to LLC originators.209 LLC statutes include some default rules which can be
amended, where their corporate counterpart has mandatory rules.210 For
example, while corporations must be managed by a board of directors, LLCs
may choose to be managed directly by members or by a board of managers.211
All of these factors complicate, slow down, and increase the costs of the
investment process to some extent. The use of less familiar legal forms requires
more drafting and reviewing.212 The less mature the body of law, the greater the
degree of legal uncertainty. Greater legal uncertainty might require more careful,
and therefore more time-consuming, drafting and reviewing.213 And, to the
extent that additional legal uncertainty remains, that itself is an additional
cost.214 Greater legal flexibility also generally requires more care and thought in
drafting and reviewing documents.
In short, the corporate form is much more “cookie-cutter” than the LLC
form.215 At the earliest stage of investment—seed rounds and the Series A
round—cookie-cutter structures are particularly desirable for two reasons. First,
they must beat any competitors to market.216 Second, the staging of investment
rounds means that early stage start-ups are in a race to “prove it or lose it.”217
They must prove their worthiness to receive the next round of financing before
they burn through their existing cash; otherwise, they will fail. In this context,
slowing the process down because of legal technicalities and wasting precious
early stage financing on legal fees are complete anathemas.218

207. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 1, at 167 (“It has been easier, historically, to create and run a start-up
organized as a corporation rather than as a partnership or LLC.”).
208. See LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 8, ¶ 303.1.4, at 3-55 (“Because most LLC statutes are recent, there is
little or no judicial guidance [which] may create uncertainty regarding the rights and obligations of and among
LLC members, managers, and officers.”).
209. Fleischer, supra note 1, at 173 (noting that the flexibility in LLC agreements “brings uncertainty” as to
“whether the agreements will be enforceable in court”).
210. For example, there is great “flexibility with respect to management of the company, the rights and
obligations from one member to another, and disclosure obligations” and the ability for “members to waive
fiduciary duties.” Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 174 (discussing how “the start-up’s lawyers have to draft appropriate protections in the LLC
operating agreement” for the uncertainty discussed above).
213. See id. at 173.
214. Id. at 175 (noting that “the uncertainty of the LLC form increases legal costs”).
215. See Crouch, supra note 25, at 210-7 (describing the “cookie cutter” approach of organizing all new
startups as C corporations).
216. Ilya Pozin, Speed Is Key to Startup Success (Here’s How to Move Fast), INC. (Aug. 31, 2016),
https://www.inc.com/ilya-pozin/speed-is-key-to-startup-success-heres-how-to-move-fast.html.
217. Venture Round, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venture_round (last updated Oct. 19, 2018).
218. Morse & Allen, supra note 40, at 360 (describing a model that shows firms who do not engage in tax
planning are rational because the tax incentives are “unlikely to motivate the desired innovative or
entrepreneurial behavior” which would lead to firm success).
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Furthermore, recall that generally about 90% of early stage start-ups will
completely fail and that early stage investors plant lots of small seeds.219
Because of these factors, there is a sense that wasting time and money on
perfecting a legal structure that will ultimately be beneficial only in the unlikely
case that the start-up succeeds is unwise. An analogy is planning on how to
spend lottery winnings before the numbers are drawn. In addition, the thought
may be that, if the company becomes successful, things can get cleaned up then.
However, as discussed above, the choice of the corporate form is in fact
permanent.220
While all of this is true to some extent, these previously discussed costs are
surely diminishing over time. LLCs have been around now for over forty years,
so there is far more familiarity than when Bankman first addressed the choiceof-entity puzzle in 1994.221 Legal uncertainty has been reduced as case law
regarding LLCs has developed. Technological improvements probably cut both
ways. On the one hand, legal databases and software make it easier to move
away from cookie-cutter approaches. On the other, technological advancements
also have made the start-up race even more frenetic.
While the existing commentary correctly recognizes that additional
transactional complexity plays a role,222 it has missed the real source of these
complications. The real problems are not the result of relative unfamiliarity or
legal uncertainty, but rather because the nature of flow-through taxation is such
that LLCs simply require greater technical expertise as well as more careful
attention.223 While a shareholder’s taxes are not affected by whatever activity
goes on down below in the corporation, an LLC member’s taxes are always
affected and potentially in very significant ways.224
Well-drafted LLC agreements must include provisions to deal with this
vicarious taxation. The most obvious example is the minimum tax distribution
provision.225 LLC agreements often include such a provision to assure investors
they will have sufficient liquidity to pay any taxes resulting from flow-through

219. See Funds of Funds Investing, supra note 187.
220. See supra Subpart I.B.
221. See generally Bankman, supra note 1.
222. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 1, at 171–73.
223. See id. at 172 (“Drafting an option on a partnership interest is a complex task and is normally much
more difficult than drafting an option on a share of common stock in the corporate context. It requires an
understanding of the parties’ economic deal, the partnership’s allocation, distribution and capital account
mechanics and the interaction of those mechanics with the purchase of a partnership interest on exercise of the
option (including, e.g., the initial capital account to be given to [the service partner] on exercise of the option
and the impact of writing up (or not writing up) capital accounts on option exercise).” (alteration in original)
(quoting William R. Welke & Olga A. Loy, Compensating the Service Partner with Partnership Equity: Code
§ 83 and Other Issues, 79 TAXES 94, 112–13 (2001))).
224. See supra Subpart IV.A.2.
225. See generally Bahar A. Schippel, Boilerplate Tax Distribution Provisions Can Get You into Hot Water,
32 TAX MGMT. REAL EST. J. 46 (2016) (discussing varying tax distribution schemes).
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income.226 These provisions must then be integrated with the ordinary
distribution waterfall, which can be quite tricky. On the other hand, there is no
need for any comparable provision in the corporate context because shareholders
will have tax consequences only if and when distributions are received, so the
ordinary distribution waterfall is all there is.227
In addition, the technical mechanics of flow-through taxation are
notoriously complicated.228 Flow-through taxation is a more conceptually
complex scheme and also one that is uniquely susceptible to taxpayer abuse.229
On the other hand, the classical corporate tax system is relatively simple. These
differences mean that LLC legal documentation is far more complicated than
their corporate counterpart. While a shareholder’s agreement may have little, if
any, tax language in it, a well-drafted LLC agreement will be inundated with tax
jargon that is understandable, if at all, only by lawyers who are expert in
partnership tax.230 The agreement will include tax provisions addressing
“qualified income offsets,” “excess nonrecourse liabilities,” and “minimum gain
chargebacks.”231 If a start-up is structured as an LLC, this state of affairs leaves
a business lawyer representing start-ups, their founders, or their investors with
two unattractive options. The lawyer can involve a tax lawyer in the matter,
which will increase the legal costs and potentially delay the transaction. Or, the
lawyer can recommend that his or her client sign an LLC agreement that the
lawyer does not completely understand and could not fully explain to the client
if asked. In the fast-paced, low-cost, plant-many-seeds, high-risk context of early
stage start-up investment, involving another lawyer on each side of the table is
an extremely unattractive option. Initial corporate classification avoids this
Sophie’s choice entirely.
5.

Ex Ante Picking and Choosing

The discussion above has assumed an “all or nothing” approach to entity
selection by start-ups. If all start-up investments held, directly or indirectly, by
an investor were LLCs, this would cause overwhelming compliance and
complexity issues. But if one or two or three were LLCs, it would probably be
226. See generally JACK S. LEVIN & DONALD E. ROCAP, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE
EQUITY, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS ¶ 1003.5, at 10-16 (Martin D. Ginsburg & Russell S. Light
eds., 2015).
227. Similarly, because of flow-through taxation, tax-exempt and foreign investors necessitate the formation
of a blocker. This complicates the ownership structure and requires the drafting of another set of organizational
documents.
228. See Foxman v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 535, 551 n.9 (1964) (“The distressingly complex and confusing nature
of the provisions of subchapter K present a formidable obstacle to the comprehension of these provisions without
the expenditure of a disproportionate amount of time and effort even by one who is sophisticated in tax matters
with many years of experience in the tax field.”).
229. See id.
230. See generally Steven R. Schneider & Brian J. O’Connor, Partnership and LLC Agreements: Learning
to Read and Write Again, 125 TAX NOTES 1323 (2009) (explaining the various tax terms found in partnership
agreements).
231. See id.
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manageable. The obvious problem is that the investor would have to select ex
ante which few investments would be held as LLCs. With twenty-twenty
foresight, investors would select their winners to be LLCs. This would allow
them to get the SUB premium on the successful exit. It would also make moot
the compliance problems associated with failing LLCs.
Of course, if the investor had twenty-twenty foresight, the investor would
only invest in winners! In the real world, early stage start-up investors simply
cannot tell which investments will succeed.232
B. OTHER COMPLICATIONS
1.

State Tax Compliance

Another complication from flow-through taxation relates to state income
taxation. If a flow-through engages in business activity within multiple states
that have an income tax, the entity has to file a tax return in each and every one
of those states.233 While corporations have the same general filing obligation,
the compliance burdens on flow-throughs (and their owners) are higher for two
reasons.
First, as with the federal income tax, state income taxation of partnerships
is simply more complicated. For example, flow-throughs need to sort through
withholding requirements for its nonresident owners.234 Some states require an
entity to file a “composite” income tax return “on behalf of its owners who are
not residents of the state.”235 Furthermore, many states have separate state
specific K-1s that the entities must file with the partners and state taxing
agency.236
Second, owners of flow-throughs are generally required to file their own
income tax returns in each and every state in which the flow-through does
business.237 While some states provide for composite returns, which alleviate the
filing burdens on owners, not all do.238 In contrast, owners of corporations have
232. See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 142 (explaining that “[e]ntrepreneurs are optimists” and how “the
gambler’s mentality of Silicon Valley would appear to be a plausible explanation for why start-ups are organized
as corporations” while “[a] behavioral law and economics approach would suggest that entrepreneurs and
venture capitalists are foolishly optimistic and should pay more attention to losses”).
233. See William C. Brown, A Primer on Income Tax Compliance for Multistate Pass-Through Entities and
Their Owners, 67 TAX LAW. 821, 861–64 (2014).
234. Id. at 861–69.
235. Id. at 864.
236. Id. at 872 n.271 (“California, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Virginia all require the preparation and filing of state specific Schedule K-1s.”).
237. See BARTLETT, supra note 21, § 3.5A(C)(4) (“If a PE/VC Fund invests in an unincorporated portfolio
company that conducts business in many states (presumably any business activities of that company in foreign
countries will be conducted through foreign corporations), its investors either will need to be included as part of
composite returns filed by the partnership or separately incur the expense and challenge of having to file their
own income tax returns in those states. Some states, however, do not give the partners this option; instead, they
require the partnership to withhold and pay state income taxes on each non-resident partner’s share of the
partnership’s income attributable to that state.”).
238. Id.
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no corresponding state income tax filing obligations resulting from their stock
ownership.239
2. Equity Compensation Design
Equity compensation (such as stock options) is extremely common in the
start-up context, because of its perceived incentive effects and because it
preserves cash.240 Equity compensation paid by corporations is far simpler and
easier to understand than that paid by LLCs.241
A service provider of a start-up corporation will be classified as an
employee and will typically receive stock options.242 The employee will receive
W-2 wages, and the employer will pay to the IRS income tax withholding and
employment taxes on both regular salary and income from the exercise of stock
options.243
Matters are far more complicated in the LLC setting. An owner of LLC
equity cannot be an employee.244 This means that any “salary” received by an
owner is not treated as W-2 wages, but instead is self-employment income.245
Accordingly, there will be no withholding by the LLC, and the service provider
will have to make quarterly estimated tax payments. In addition, instead of
receiving stock options, the service provider will receive so-called “profits
interests,” which are economically very similar to stock options but are
somewhat more complicated and are far less common in the start-up
community.246 The bottom line is that it is simpler and more common to issue
and receive W-2 wages and stock options than to issue and receive selfemployment income and profits interests.
C. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN FETCHING THE SUB PREMIUM
Recall that the three general benefits of flow-through taxation are (1) single
taxation of income, (2) flow-through (rather than trapping) of losses, and (3) the
239. Id.
240. See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 167 (“[C]ompensation issues make the C corp structure more attractive
than the pass-through structure.”).
241. Id.
242. Founders of the company will generally receive “founder’s stock,” which is vested or unvested shares
of stock (as opposed to options). Employees hired after founding generally receive stock options. The reason for
this difference is that, at the founding of the company, the shares are worth nearly nothing, so the founders can
pay full fair market value for their shares (for example, a penny a share). As the company matures, the stock
value grows and, if an employee receives shares by paying less than full value, the employee realizes immediate
ordinary income. Giving stock options, with a fair market value exercise price, avoids this problem. See
generally Polsky & Hellwig, supra note 71.
243. See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 168.
244. Id. at 169.
245. See id. at 170 (“[E]mployees who are treated as partners would have to pay an additional selfemployment tax on salary . . . .”).
246. While in theory the service provider can receive “unit options,” options to buy units of the LLC, the
tax treatment of the exercise of partnership options is unsettled and can result in onerous and counterintuitive
consequences for the non-exercising LLC owners. For these reasons, tax professionals generally strongly prefer
profits interests, which are economically very similar to partnership options, over unit options.
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ability to deliver a SUB to a buyer on exit.247 In the start-up context, the single
taxation of income is often irrelevant, as profits are not typically realized before
exit. And the loss flow-through benefit, while not completely irrelevant, can be
significantly blunted by the presence of tax-indifferent investors, the passive
activity loss limitations applicable to U.S. individuals, the scarcity of corporate
investment, and the allocation of only net income (and not losses) to individual
fund managers with respect to their carried interest.248 In contrast, the third
benefit—the ability to deliver a SUB to the buyer and fetch a premium purchase
price—retains much of its apparent value even in the unique start-up context.249
While traditional tax-indifferent investors will generally not benefit from this
(because they are forced to invest through blockers and exit by selling blocker
stock), all other investors should receive a significant premium purchase on exit.
However, delivering a SUB is only beneficial to sellers to the extent that
buyers are willing to pay a premium for it. The expected value of the SUB can
be substantial. As previously mentioned, under reasonable assumptions, a
premium of approximately 20%, relative to a purchase price based on a carryover basis (COB), can be expected. Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom is
that the public stock market severely undervalues SUBs (as well as tax assets
more generally), and in fact may completely ignore them, in valuing a
company.250 Because the desired exit for successful start-ups is either to go
public or to be acquired by a public company, undervaluation of the SUB by the
public markets would dramatically reduce or perhaps completely eliminate the
most significant tax-related benefit to structuring start-ups as LLCs.
1. The Theoretical Advantage of Delivering a SUB
When an acquirer buys a successful business, it will generally prefer to take
the business’s assets (including intangible assets like goodwill and going
concern value) with a SUB rather than the lower COB.251 The higher the basis
in the assets, the greater the buyer’s future depreciation and amortization
deductions.252 In addition, gains on the sales of the purchased assets (such as
inventory) will be lower, while losses will be greater.253 All of these
consequences serve to lower the buyer’s future tax burden, resulting in more
after-tax cash in its pockets.254 As a result, the buyer should theoretically be
willing to pay more for the business with a SUB than without it.

247. See supra Subpart I.B. (explaining single taxation of income and loss flow-through); infra note 108
and accompanying text (noting the SUB delivery).
248. See supra Part III.
249. See infra Subpart IV.C.1.
250. See Polsky & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 429 & n.62.
251. See Michael L. Schler, Basic Tax Issues in Acquisition Transactions, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 879, 887–
88 (2012) (explaining the benefit to the buyer of a SUB).
252. See id. at 887.
253. See id.
254. See id. (explaining that the present value tax savings of a SUB is approximately 20% of the SUB, using
traditional assumptions).
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The theoretical premium equals the amount of expected future tax
reductions discounted to present value.255 This value depends on a host of
factors, including future marginal tax rates, the time and manner in which the
buyer generates future annual taxable income, the allocation of the purchase
price among various types of assets, and the appropriate discount rate.256 The
higher the marginal tax rates, the greater the tax savings, and vice versa.
Marginal rates can be affected by tax legislation or by changes in the profitability
of the buyer.257 A long delay in reaching profitability reduces the present value
of future tax savings. Allocation of the purchase price affects the SUB’s present
value because the greater the allocations to assets whose costs are recovered
quickly (through, for example, quick sales or fast depreciation schedules), the
greater the tax savings in the early years. And the discount rate is critical
because, while some tax reduction from a SUB may occur shortly after the
purchase, a significant portion of it may be recognized only years down the road.
This is because, for highly successful businesses, like a start-up that is going
public, the vast majority of the purchase price will be allocated to goodwill,
which is depreciated ratably over fifteen years.258
Some reasonable assumptions, at least for purposes of merely ballparking
the theoretical value of a SUB, are that (1) the buyer’s future marginal tax rate
is equal to the combined federal and state corporate rate of 40% (consistent with
historical rates); (2) all of the SUB is allocated to goodwill; and (3) the
appropriate discount rate is 10%.259 Under these assumptions, the theoretical
SUB premium is approximately 20% of the step up.260 This means that if a buyer
was willing to pay $1 billion for a business with a COB of zero, the buyer should
be willing to pay roughly $1.2 billion if it gets a SUB. Using the new corporate
tax rate of 21% (down dramatically from 35%) and assuming no state corporate
tax,261 but holding all other assumptions constant, would yield a SUB premium
of 12%. Because this Article is analyzing historical choice of entity decisionmaking, it will use the estimated 20% premium that results from the application
of the historical 35% corporate rate. Note also that, technically, the premium is
based on the amount of the step up, not the overall purchase price. But in the
start-up context, exited companies will typically not have significant basis,
because they will have used most of their investment proceeds on deductible
255. See Polsky & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 420.
256. See id.; see also Schler, supra note 251, at 887 (approximating the value of SUB based on certain
assumptions).
257. See I.R.C. § 1 (Supp. V 2017) (providing new graduated tax rates).
258. See id. § 197; see also Schler, supra note 251, at 887 (“In practice, much of the step up is usually
allocable to intangible assets of Target that have a very low tax basis to Target and for which Acquiring is
permitted to amortize the new basis over 15 years.”).
259. This may seem high, but given the risky nature of the future tax benefits (as a result of doubts about
profitability or changes in corporate tax rates) it is not unreasonable. A lower discount rate would increase the
SUB premium.
260. See Schler, supra note 251, at 887.
261. I.R.C. § 11(b) (Supp. V 2017) (after passage of the Tax and Job Cuts Act of 2017); I.R.C. § 11(b)
(Supp. IV 2016) (before passage of the Act).
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expenses, such as research and development expenses and employee
compensation.262 Thus, for ease of exposition, this Article assumes a 20% SUB
premium relative to an otherwise equivalent COB purchase price.
Delivering a SUB is extremely easy for businesses that are organized as
LLCs or other tax partnerships. The partnership can simply sell their assets to
the buyer. Or the buyer can buy all of the outstanding LLC interests. Because a
single member LLC is disregarded for income tax purposes, the tax law treats
such a transaction as a sale of all of the assets to the buyer.263 Critically, in either
case, gains recognized from the (actual or deemed) sale of the assets are taxed
once and only once at the owner level, as a result of flow-through taxation.264
There is no second level of tax. In addition, because much of the overall gain
generated by the sales of highly successful start-ups is attributable to goodwill,
which is a capital asset, the vast majority of the gain is typically taxed at
preferential capital gains rates.265
For these reasons, it is easy for LLC owners to deliver to the buyer its
desired SUB. This is not the case in the corporate context, because of double
taxation. A sale of corporate assets, which would result in the buyer receiving a
SUB, would result in immediate tax at the corporate level and then, when the
sales proceeds are distributed to the shareholders, another tax at the shareholder
level.266 Even with the SUB premium, this immediate double taxation would
commonly leave the shareholders with less after-tax cash than if they had sold
their stock. In such a stock sale, the buyer would receive only a COB in the
business’s assets and therefore would not pay the SUB premium. But by
avoiding the double tax, the shareholders would still be better off even while
foregoing the SUB premium.
To illustrate, consider a corporation owned by a single individual. The
corporation’s stock is worth $100, the corporation’s only asset is goodwill with
a zero basis, and the shareholder’s basis is zero. A sale of the stock for $100
would leave the shareholder with $80, assuming a 20%capital gains rate. If
instead the transaction was structured as a sale of assets, the buyer would be

262. See I.R.C. § 174(a) (2012) (allowing deduction of research and development expenditures); I.R.C
§ 162(a)(1) (allowing deduction of employee compensation).
263. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(ii) (2018) (stating that a domestic eligible entity with one owner is
treated as a disregarded entity under the default rule); Rev. Rul. 99-6, 1999-6 I.R.B. (concluding that a purchase
of all of an LLC’s interests by a single purchaser is treated as an asset purchase for tax purposes). If there are
multiple buyers, or if the buyer wishes to buy only a portion of the outstanding LLC interests, the SUB can be
delivered if the LLC makes a § 754 election.
264. See I.R.C. § 701 (Supp. V 2017).
265. Better Beverages, Inc. v. United States, 619 F.2d 424, 425 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[G]oodwill is a capital
asset . . . .”); Dixie Fin. Co. v. United States, 474 F.2d 501, 506 n.5 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that “[g]oodwill is a
capital asset, and amounts received therefor in excess of the seller’s basis are treated as capital gains,” but that
they represent a nonamortizable capital investment resulting in no corresponding deduction for the purchaser);
Comm’r v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1963) (“It is settled that goodwill, as a distinct property right, is
a capital asset under the tax laws.”); Michaels v. Comm’r, 12 T.C. 17 (1949) (“We entertain no doubt that good
will and such related items as customers’ lists are capital assets.”).
266. See Polsky & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 421–22.
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willing to pay $120 because of the SUB premium. The corporation would then
pay $42 in corporate tax ($120 x .35), leaving $78 to be distributed.267 The $78
distribution would leave the shareholder with $62.40 of cash ($78 x (1 – .2)),
which is $17.60 less than when the shareholder had sold stock. Thus, the
shareholder would sell stock. Had the corporation been initially formed as an
LLC, the buyer would buy assets and leave the owner of the LLC with $96 after
tax ($120 – $24 capital gains tax).
Stepping back from the technicalities, these results make perfect sense. A
purchase of corporate assets reduces the buyer’s future corporate tax liabilities
with respect to the amount of built-in gain in the acquired assets.268 But at the
same time, an asset sale increases the seller’s current corporate tax liabilities
with respect to the same amount of built-in gain. Because of the time-value of
money, this tradeoff of less future taxes for greater current taxes in the same
amount is not desirable unless the buyer’s future corporate tax rates are
significantly greater than the seller’s current corporate tax rate.
2. Discussion of SUB Delivery in the Existing Literature
The ability of LLCs to deliver SUBs is quite a big deal. A purchase price
premium of 20%is significant. And the premiums can be staggering in absolute
terms. For corporate start-ups that go public, the theoretical value of the SUB
can easily be in the hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars. Furthermore,
in contrast to the tax benefit of loss flow-throughs, there are no restrictions or
limitations, such as the passive activity rules, that would impair this benefit, and
it is fully available to carried interest holders and super tax-exempts.
Despite its significance, the academic literature on start-up choice-of-entity
has, with one exception, completely ignored the theoretical SUB premium. Only
Fleischer even mentioned it, but only briefly near the very end of his article.269
He correctly noted that “an asset sale from a partnership has the distinct
advantage of giving the buyer a step-up in basis in the target’s assets without
incurring an extra layer of tax,” explaining the mechanics of the SUB on the
second-to last paragraph in a fifty-page article.270
3.

Delivery of the SUB in Practice

The theoretical value of SUBs is indisputable. SUBs are expected to lower
future tax liabilities, leaving the business with greater after-tax cash than in an
otherwise identical COB transaction. Of course, it is possible that the business
might not generate sufficient profits to utilize the SUBs or even that the
corporate tax could be drastically reduced or even eliminated entirely through

267.
268.
269.
270.

Before 2018, the corporate tax rate was 35%. See I.R.C. § 11(b) (Supp. IV 2016).
See Schler, supra note 251, at 888.
See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 184.
Id.
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legislation.271 In fact, the top statutory corporate rate was recently reduced
dramatically.272 But these risks only go to the amount of expected value, not to
the question of whether there is any such value. SUBs would have zero expected
value only if it was absolutely certain that the business will never generate
profits or that the corporate tax would immediately be eliminated in its entirety.
However, when start-ups go public or are acquired by public companies, there
is surely the expectation that they will eventually become profitable, and the
corporate income tax has been in place for over 100 years.273 Thus, it is safe to
say that SUBs of start-ups that are exited have significant theoretical value.
Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom is that the public stock market
routinely disregards SUBs (or places an extremely low value on them) in valuing
businesses despite their theoretical value.274 The traditional explanation for this
is based on two factors. First, the public market, in valuing businesses, appears
to place great weight on metrics that are based on financial accounting earnings,
such as EBIT or EBITDA.275 Second, these accounting metrics do not reflect the
tax benefits resulting from a SUB.276 The result is that the earnings, EBIT, and
EBITDA of an acquired business will be the same regardless of whether the
acquirer gets a SUB or COB.277 Accordingly, a valuation of the business based
on a multiple of these metrics will yield the same value in either case.
An alternative explanation for the stock market’s tendency to discount
SUBs is that the future tax benefits are in fact rationally significantly
discounted.278 Rational discounting may be the product of significant concerns
about future profitability, future corporate tax rates (or even the future viability
of the corporate tax), and the availability of tax avoidance opportunities.279 All
of these concerns would reduce expected future marginal effective tax rates,
which in turn reduces the value of SUBs.280
Regardless of the reason, the widely held view is that the public market
does not pay very much for SUBs.281 As evidence, commentators point to the
fact that traditionally when LLCs went public, they simply incorporated on a

271. For example, if the federal income tax were transformed into a consumption tax, the corporate income
tax would be eliminated.
272. Compare I.R.C. § 11(b) (Supp. V 2017) (21% corporate rate), with I.R.C. § 11(b) (Supp. IV 2016)
(35% corporate rate). The new rate will be in effect on January 1, 2018.
273. See Jack Taylor, Corporation Income Tax Brackets and Rates, 1909–2002, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02corate.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) (showing corporate tax rates from 1909
through 2002).
274. See Polsky & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 429–32.
275. See generally Lawrence M. Benveniste & Paul A. Spindt, How Investment Bankers Determine the
Offer Price and Allocation of New Issues, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 343 (1989); Moonchul Kim & Jay R. Ritter, Valuing
IPOs, 53 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (1999).
276. See Polsky & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 429–32.
277. See id.
278. See id. at 432–33.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. See id.
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tax-free basis, thereby relinquishing any opportunity to achieve an SUB.282 In
other words, they effectively gave away the SUB for free. Commentators also
point to the increasingly popularity of tax receivable agreements (TRAs) in
going-public transactions.283 TRAs allocate most (usually 85%) of the tax
benefit resulting from a SUB or other tax attribute back to the sellers if and when
the tax attribute actually reduces the buyer’s future taxes.284 In essence, TRAs
leave the tax attribute (technically, 85% of it) back with the sellers. The logical
implication of a TRA is that the sellers value the tax attribute significantly more
than the buyer. Absent such a pricing disparity, the parties would simply price
the tax attribute into the deal and avoid the administrative problems of carving
it out.285 The annual computation, payment, and tax and financial reporting of
TRA payments is administratively burdensome, TRA rights can result in some
messy conflicts of interest, and the mere existence of a TRA complicates the
initial public offering (“IPO”) process.286 Thus, the pricing disparity must be
significant enough to justify these significant complications.
The conventional wisdom surely helps explain the traditional preference
for corporate classification by start-ups. The desired exit for start-ups is usually
to either go public or to be sold to a public company.287 In either case, the
effective buyer is the public market. If the buyer is not going to pay a premium
for a SUB, the only significant benefit of being an LLC is eliminated.288 The
best evidence of this futility is that, until only recently, LLCs that went public
would convert on a tax-free basis to a corporation thereby relinquishing the
prospect of a SUB.289 These LLCs went through all the complications of the
LLC form from their inception all the way up to the IPO, but ultimately got
nothing for their troubles.
Compare, for example, two start-ups that go public—one that was formed
as an LLC and the other as a corporation. The one that was formed as an LLC is
converted tax-free on the eve of its IPO to a corporation (as was historically
common), and it therefore delivers a COB. The one that was formed as a
corporation uses the corporation as the public vehicle, automatically delivering
a COB. They each end up in mostly the same place. The differences are (1) the
LLC’s pre-IPO losses flowed through to its owners while the corporation’s
losses were trapped, but as discussed above this benefit is much smaller than it
appears due to the presence of tax-indifferent ownership and the passive activity
rules, (2) the LLC resulted in additional administrative, transactional, and
compliance complexity (including the utilization of a blocker corporation in the
282. See generally Gladriel Shobe, Supercharged IPOs and the Up-C, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 913 (2017).
283. See Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founders’ Stock, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 60, 90–91 (2011).
284. See Polsky & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 452–56.
285. See id. at 454.
286. See id. at 457 (noting the costs of negotiating, drafting, and administering a TRA).
287. See supra Subpart II.B.
288. Recall that single taxation of ordinary course income and flow-through of losses are not significant
benefits in the start-up context.
289. See generally Victor Fleischer & Nancy Staudt, The Supercharged IPO, 67 VAND. L. REV. 307 (2014).
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ownership structure), and (3) the LLC required a restructuring on the eve of the
IPO. All things considered, it is not surprising that corporate classification was
the preferred approach for start-ups.
D. SUMMARY
The existing academic literature on start-up entity choice has
underappreciated two factors that historically encouraged the use of the
corporate form. Tax compliance issues and the additional transactional
complexity associated with LLCs were especially problematic. In the early stage
start-up context, numerous investors make many small investments, time is of
the essence, legal costs are disfavored, and the vast majority of companies end
up completely worthless. These factors make the extra administrative burdens
of LLCs far more problematic than prior commentators realized.
At the same time, the actual benefits of LLCs are smaller than they might
appear. The ability to fetch a premium purchase price for delivering a SUB
should in theory be quite significant. Furthermore, the premium should be
available to a broad swath of start-up investors. However, the conventional
wisdom is that public companies will not pay much, if anything, for a SUB.
Because the desired exit of a start-up is to become, or be acquired by, a public
company, the ability to actually fetch a premium for delivering SUB is more
theoretical than real.
Thus, upon close reflection, the traditional costs of using an LLC turn out
to be higher than previously understood, while what appears to be the most
significant benefit is in fact much smaller or even nonexistent.
CONCLUSION
The historical preference of start-ups for corporations over LLCs has
puzzled observers for over twenty-five years. Despite gallant efforts by prior
commentators, no one has yet adequately explained the phenomenon. This
Article attempts to do so by identifying two significant practical issues, one of
which makes the LLC form more burdensome than previously appreciated and
the other that makes a theoretical benefit of using LLCs impossible to fully
monetize. Due to the unique nature of early stage start-up investment, tax
compliance issues and transactional complexity associated with LLCs are
particularly problematic. And, because of valuation idiosyncrasies by the public
market, SUB premiums, which should be generated in sales by LLC owners, are
practically unavailable in typical start-up exits. Combined, these two factors
explain the puzzle.
While this explains the historical tendency to prefer the corporate form,
recent legislative developments and structural innovations will dramatically
affect the choice of entity analysis going forward. An exclusion for qualified
small business stock, which historically was immaterial but was recently
significantly expanded, can exempt some of the gain recognized by U.S.
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individual investors in start-ups from capital gains tax.290 New corporate income
tax rates, effective for the first time in January 2018, are vastly reduced from a
top marginal rate of 35% to a flat rate of 21%.291 These factors push in favor of
corporate classification.
On the other hand, a relatively new legal innovation, the Up-C IPO
structure, pushes in favor of partnership classification.292 In an Up-C IPO, the
potential for a SUB is preserved. Historically, when LLCs went public, the SUB
was essentially given away for free because of the perception that public markets
do not value it. To solve the valuation pricing problem described above, Up-C
IPOs include tax receivable agreements, which allocate the ultimate benefits of
the preserved SUBs to the LLC owners.293 While Up-C IPOs are more complex
than traditional IPOs of LLCs, market acceptance of the structure has been
growing exponentially.294 The end result is that LLC owners can now much
more easily monetize the benefit of creating SUBs, which pushes in favor of
using LLCs over corporations.
In addition, the new pass-through deduction, which generally excludes
20%of LLC income recognized by a U.S. individual investor from tax and which
became effective on January 1, 2018, also pushes in favor of LLCs.295 Because
of these four recent developments—the expanded exclusion for qualified small
business stock, the new corporate tax rate, the market acceptance of Up-Cs, and
the pass-through deduction—the ground has shifted considerably regarding
choice-of-entity. Nevertheless, the pragmatic problems that would stem from
widespread LLC adoption in the VC world remain and will likely remain
insurmountable, regardless of these developments.

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See I.R.C. § 1202 (Supp. V 2017).
See id. § 11(a).
See generally Polsky & Rosenzweig, supra note 2.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 417.
See I.R.C. § 199A (Supp. V 2017).

